The third SEAL accused in the assault of an alleged al-Qaida terrorist pleaded not guilty Tuesday to charges of dereliction of duty and making a false official statement in a military court on Norfolk Naval Base.
Trial by court-martial is set for 6 April 2010, Navy Times reports. The other two SEAL’s alleged to be involved with violating the UCMJ have each plead not guilty and have trial dates set.
Seven U.S. soldiers, including three men, have already been punished under six-week-old rules making pregnancy a violation of military law in northern Iraq.
Stars & Stripes reports.
The four soldiers who became pregnant were given letters of reprimand that will not remain a part of the permanent military file, Cucolo said, as were two of the male soldiers.
For some years now, primarily relating to Iraq/Afghanistan cases there has been lots of litigation by media and congress. The current move to save the SEALs by congress is just the most recent example of seeking to influence a court-martial case. The “litigation” has been both for and against the military member. We all remember the issue of Congressman Murtha calling for prosecution of a Marine for alleged misconduct. Whether such litigation is good for the system and the UCMJ is a different question. In this day and age of millisecond journalism and sound-bites here are a couple of thoughts and a caution. LawProf blog has posted:
Laurie L. Levenson (Loyola Law School Los Angeles) has posted Prosecutorial Soundbites: When Do They Cross the Line? (Georgia Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Even good prosecutors can cross the line with media soundbites. Especially in high-profile cases, prosecutors must assess if their pretrial remarks about a case meet their ethical obligations. In Gentile v. Nevada State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that while lawyers have the First Amendment right to make comments to the press, they do not have the right to make comments that have a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Although ethical codes have adopted this broad standard, many have failed to identify more specifically when a prosecutor’s remarks pose a substantial likelihood of having such a prejudicial effect. Using 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 as a guide, this article seeks to identify those “hot-button” areas.
At this point, the military judge interjected and asked 11 foundational questions of the witness. The questions were limited to Major D’s past service as an enlisted Marine in the same MOS as the appellant, his supervisory responsibilities as a Marine Corps gunnery sergeant within that MOS, the total number of years he served within the MOS, and the duties generally assigned within the MOS. Defense counsel did not object to any of the 11 questions asked by the military judge.
The NMCCA did not find the military judge’s laying a foundation for admissibility deprived the accused of a fair trial, in United States v. Davis, NMCCA 200900406 (N-M.C. Ct. Crim. App. 15 December 2009). The court did not opine on why the trial counsel was unprepared to lay a foundation for the witnesses testimony, but did consider the failure of the defense to object as adverse to the accused.
Bottom line to the case: trial counsel need not prepare to lay a foundation for witness testimony or documents, because if they don’t the military judge will do it for them. Teaching point, trial counsel need not be aware of the rules for admission of testimony and laying a foundation, and they need not interview and prepare their witness in advance of trial.
With a core part of my business relating to recruiter misconduct issues within the services, I found this item interesting.
Inland rape, other cases spur new ethics training for Marine recruiters.
About 20 military court-martial trials involving recruiters are under way at any given time, Richardson said. He said statistics show about 3 percent of recruiters are dismissed or face criminal charges for misconduct. He estimated that another 4 or 5 percent probably don’t get caught.
I blogged a bit of gossip the other day that there may now be up to 12 trial counsel working on Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s court-martial. I had blogged that Major Hasan had two military counsel, that appears wrong, and so too might be the rumor of 12 TC.
Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused of killing 12 soldiers and a civilian at Fort Hood last month, won’t get the two additional military lawyers his defense team has requested.
John P. Galligan, the retired Army colonel who is representing Maj. Hasan, asked the Army earlier this month to add the veteran legal officers to the defense team. In addition to Mr. Galligan, Maj. Hasan has a military-appointed defense counsel, Maj. Christopher Martin.
The man accused of the Fort Hood shooting rampage is facing tighter restrictions on his communication with the world outside the hospital room, where he lies paralyzed from the chest down, his lawyer said Monday.
The lawyer, John P. Galligan, said Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan fell asleep during an hour-long hearing held at his hospital bed on Saturday, during which a military magistrate ruled that the suspect should be placed in pretrial confinement. That is a legal status that essentially turns his hospital room, at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, into a jail cell.
He added that he is concerned the Army plans to move Maj. Hasan to Bell County jail here, which is under contract with Fort Hood to serve as a brig, when house-arrest might be more appropriate.
You’ll have seen the blogging and news reports about the potential consequences of a pregnancy while serving in the AOR – which could include court-martial.
A US Army general in northern Iraq has defended his decision to add pregnancy to the list of reasons a soldier under his command could face court martial.
A former Navy master chief petty officer was sentenced Dec. 11 to four years in prison for stealing nearly $40 million in fuel from the U.S. Army in Iraq, according to the Department of Justice.
Stars & Stripes reports. One suspects he might of received a higher sentence if prosecuted at court-martial under the UCMJ, as a retiree recall.
A wide-ranging Department of Defense survey revealed the rate of servicemembers attempting suicide has doubled in recent years, coinciding with an increase in those reporting symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and those abusing prescription drugs.
Why am I not surprised by Issue III. See one of my earlier blogs — The Prosecutor’s Gamble. I’ve blogged several times about trial counsel “suppression” of evidence or information favorable to the defense, despite frequent public relations statements and appellate cases lauding the more open discovery to which a court-martial accused is entitled to under the UCMJ.
The military justice system provides for broader discovery than required by practice in federal civilian criminal trials. See United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 439-40 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
Statutory and implemental regulatory discovery rights of a military accused are more generous than the constitutional discovery rights of his civilian counterpart. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 38 M.J. 376 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Green, 37 M.J. 88 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12 (C.M.A. 1986).
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog