In In re LB, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals addressed an important discovery issue in a pending court-martial: when may a military judge allow the defense to seek limited information about a complaining witness’s medical or mental health treatment? The court denied the victim’s request for emergency relief and allowed the military judge’s discovery order to remain in place. For any military defense counsel or military defense lawyer handling sexual assault litigation, the opinion offers a useful look at how military courts are working through the boundaries of mental health privilege and defense discovery.

The case arose from the court-martial of Technical Sergeant Irvin Bryant, Jr., who faced charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including offenses under Articles 120 and 128b. The petitioner, identified as LB, was the named victim in each specification. LB asked the Air Force appellate court to block the military judge’s order before the case moved further toward trial.

The central issue involved what the defense could learn about LB’s mental health history. Earlier in the case, the defense sought access to certain mental health records. The military judge refused to order production of privileged communications between LB and mental health providers. Later, however, the judge ruled that the defense could seek limited non-privileged information, often called Mellette material. Under United States v. Mellette, diagnoses, treatments, and similar information in medical records do not automatically receive the same privilege protection as confidential communications with a psychotherapist. That distinction can matter a great deal to a military defense lawyer preparing to challenge credibility, evaluate prior statements, or build a theory of defense.

United States v. Navarro  ·  ARMY 20250171  ·  Army Court of Criminal Appeals  ·  March 30, 2026

What Happened

An Army Specialist pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography under Article 134 of the UCMJ. His defense lawyer negotiated a plea deal that kept him out of prison entirely. The only punishment: a bad-conduct discharge. No confinement. No additional penalties. For this type of charge, that outcome stands out as remarkably favorable.

The First Amendment follows you into uniform, but it does not follow you the same way. Service members who do not understand where the line falls often cross it without knowing—and pay with their careers. This informational post is brought to you by Cave & Freeburg, LLP, at court-martial.com.

On March 25, 2026, the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals issued its decision in United States v. Williams-Clark (ARMY 20230185). The court set aside a sexual assault conviction — one that carried a two-year confinement term — not on the merits, but because the verdict itself was fatally ambiguous. The military judge convicted Private Williams-Clark of sexual assault without consent while simultaneously acquitting him of sexual assault when the victim was incapable of consenting. Both specifications covered the same day, the same location, and the same victim — but two separate sexual acts.

The court could not determine which act formed the basis of the conviction. That uncertainty, the court held, made meaningful appellate review impossible. The conviction had to go.

What Actually Happened at Trial