And here is an Air Force Times report:
When Rohan Coombs joined the Marine Corps, he never thought one day he would be locked up in an immigration detention center and facing deportation from the country he had vowed to defend. . . .
The estimates are of about 8000 non-U.S. citizens enlisting to serve in the U.S. armed forces in any given year.
United States v. Pippins, is a reminder that when a person possesses drug for a persons own use and/or distribution, the possession is an LIO of the use or the distribution.
A review of multiplicity in this case centers on whether the appellant’s possession of BZP is in the same act or course of conduct with her use and distribution of BZP. See United States v. Paxton, 64 M.J. 484, 490 (C.A.A.F. 2007); United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370, 373 (C.M.A. 1993). Possession is a lesser included offense of both use and, under the facts of this case, distribution. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2008 ed.), Part IV, ¶ 37d. See also United States v. Zubko, 18 M.J. 378, 385-86 (C.A.A.F. 1984).
Thus, any time an accused is charged with both use and possession or distribution and possession of the same amount, there should be a dismissal for multiplicity.
For all of the criticisms of military justice and the UCMJ, you don’t have this at court-martial as tipped by Sentencing Law & Policy blog.
Cargill, a federal public defender, was perturbed by a rarely discussed U.S. court rule that critics say conflicts with the presumption of judicial openness. In the Western District of Virginia, as in many other U.S. court districts, a probation officer makes a secret sentencing recommendation to the judge. Cargill accidentally saw the probation officer’s recommendation for his client. The report was "misleading and inaccurate," Cargill wrote in a protest letter. (Emphasis added.)
Here is a link to the full article in the Roanoke (VA) Times.
Air Force Times reports:
A U.S. soldier was taken into custody after an Afghan detainee was found dead in his cell, apparently from a gunshot wound, NATO said in a statement Tuesday night.
Military.com reports:
Federal Evidence Review references:
In conspiracy and arson trial, reversing and remanding when trial court failed "to make adequate inquiries regarding news stories" that appeared during deliberations and their impact on juror’s deliberations; the judge erroneously failed to explore "whether any juror heard any of the information" and its impact on the jury, in United States v. Waters, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2010) (No. 08-30222)
The Ninth Circuit recently considered the trial court’s responsibilities to make specific inquiry of jurors when "adverse publicity occurs during deliberations" of the jury. The case can help clear up confusion about the role of the trial court, particularly in light of FRE 606(b) limiting inquiry into a verdict.
USA Today is reporting that Morlock has been referred to trial non-capital. As does Reuters, MSNBC and other news outlets.
I happened to have business at MDW today so I stopped by to take LTC Lakin’s pulse for his upcoming court-martial and watch today’s Article 39(a), UCMJ, session.
The writ was denied today. A straight line standard denial [thanks to CAAFLog for a copy].
1. Mr. Jensen was excused from further participation in the case at the specific affirmative consent of LTC Lakin, because he’d been “discharged.” See R.C.M. 506(c).
Today the court will hear oral argument in Premo v. Moore, a case with potential ramifications for court-martials. Courtesy of SCOTUSBlog here is a summary:
The Sixth Amendment secures a criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland v. Washington (1984), that right is violated when a lawyer’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, resulting in prejudice to the defendant. Counsel’s representation is prejudicial when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the lawyer’s deficiencies, the proceeding would have ended differently. Some defendants accept a plea bargain and then argue that their counsel was ineffective; in those cases, Hill v. Lockhart (1985) instructs a court to ask whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have gone to trial had his counsel been constitutionally adequate. When the Court hears argument tomorrow in Premo v. Moore (09-658), it will attempt to clarify how Strickland and Hill apply to plea deals that are made after counsel fails to suppress an unconstitutionally obtained confession.
For those who want to go right to the papers here is the SCOTUSBlog page.
Huffington Post has this piece about PMC’s and the UCMJ.
It is common to complain that the while the use of private military contractors (PMC) has grown rapidly in the past decade, the legal apparatus to hold them accountable has failed to keep pace. But that is not as true as it once was. In fact, there are at least four distinct sources of criminal law that can hold contractors accountable for their actions: (1) international law, (2) host-nation law, (3) U.S. civilian law, and (4) U.S. military law. Of course, all of these have their own limitations and problems, such as jurisdiction and applicability.
But military law, at least for the U.S., the world’s biggest consumer of PMC services, military law shows increased promise.
In a court-martial under the court-martial UCMJ setting, can a PTA bind the prosecution/convening authority to something he or she has no control over — generally the conditions of confinement. There’s a teachable moment here for the court-martial practitioner.
Air Force Times reports:
The attorney for a former al-Qaida cook said Monday that the government did not deliver on a promise that led him to plead guilty to supporting terrorism, and she said that could discourage other inmates at Guantanamo from reaching deals with prosecutors.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog