Examiner.com asks:
Why would a highly placed, decorated Army officer set to be promoted to colonel risk court-martial by refusing to obey orders?
Military.com reports.
Examiner.com asks:
Why would a highly placed, decorated Army officer set to be promoted to colonel risk court-martial by refusing to obey orders?
Military.com reports.
Both Hutchinson and her civilian attorney, Rai Sue Sussman, are happy with the results. In a press release from Sussman’s office, Hutchinson said that she is "excited to know what will happen to me, and that I am not facing jail.
“Alexis is pleased because she now will have closure and knows what is going to happen to her," Sussman told Truthout. "She is no longer waiting to possibly go to trial and jail, all the while trying to figure out what to do with her child. She feels she was treated unfairly overall, but is relieved with this outcome."
Jeff Paterson, the director of the soldier advocacy group Courage to Resist, which has assisted Hutchinson, felt that the administrative discharge was a victory all around.
In 1988 the Court of Military Appeals decided Griffith. I have used the case from time to time, not often successfully. But here is a recent example of what I call 917-on-steroids. I was pleasantly surprised that it was the judge who first raised the Griffith possibility.
R.C.M. 917 allows the defense to make a motion (or the MJ sua sponte) for a finding of not guilty at the close of the prosecution case or at the close of the evidence. I have just completed one of the infamous Army TCS/Reserve TDY cases. The E-8 accused was charged with conspiracy with two others to steal using fraudulent rent receipts, false official statement, theft of funds in excess of $500.00, and two specifications of fraud under Article 132, UCMJ. The standard or amount of evidence is so low that it is hard to obtain an R.C.M. 917 dismissal.
At the close of the prosecution case they had not introduced evidence of a delta between the amount alleged to have been stolen and that to what the accused would have been entitled, and had not introduced evidence that the travel claim vouchers were actually signed and submitted by the accused. Rather than grant a 917 motion, the judge allowed the prosecution time to rethink their case and potentially request they be allowed to reopen. After the interlude the judge kicked the can and referenced Griffith, again giving the prosecution more opportunity to reopen. The military judge is permitted to take such a course of action. See e.g. United States v. Ray, 26 M.J. 468 (C.M.A. 1988).