nmcca Tag Archives — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog

What can we do for you

April 17, 2024 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Military service is a noble calling, but it can also lead to complex legal situations. When facing accusations or disciplinary actions, having experienced legal representation is crucial. Cave & Freeburg, LLP stands firmly behind service members across all branches (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard) with a proven track record of success in a wide range of military legal issues. Here’s how Cave & Freeburg, LLP can be your military defense lawyer and advocate:

1. Court-Martial Defense:

A court-martial is a serious matter that can result in a dishonorable discharge, imprisonment, and a ruined career. Cave & Freeburg, LLP brings decades of combined experience to your defense. Their attorneys have a deep understanding of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and extensive experience navigating the complexities of court-martial trials and appeals. They will:

Military ineffective assistance of counsel

February 21, 2023 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

In the context of a court-martial, ineffective assistance of counsel refers to a claim by a military defendant that their defense counsel provided them with legal representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficient representation prejudiced the outcome of their case.

Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), military defendants have the right to be represented by counsel at trial. If a defendant believes that their defense counsel provided them with ineffective assistance, they can raise this claim on appeal. The standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a court-martial is the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984.

Under the Strickland test, the defendant must show that their counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Deficient performance means that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Double Jeopardy

February 6, 2023 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

A person being tried at court-martial may have their case dismissed before the members (jury) reach any findings. One way that can happen is when the military judge declares a mistrial. Your military defense lawyer should know what to do if the same charges are re-referred to a court-martial–the prosecution taking a second attempt to convict you.

In a recent case, we had that happen. Unlike uniformed defense counsel, we immediately filed a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to prevent the second trial. In Murillo, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has agreed that (1) the court has jurisdiction to hear a Writ petition on this issue and (2) the military judge erred in declaring a mistrial. Thus, the court has dismissed the charges. (As of 5 Feb., we do have to wait to see if the prosecution will appeal that decision.)

The Double Jeopardy Clause‘s whole concept is to protect the accused from a second or subsequent trial on the same charges. The trial itself is what is prohibited. The case is United States v. Murillo, No. 202200132 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2023) (unpub.). The Double Jeopardy Clause is in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which says, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . ” The bar against double jeopardy comes from English common law, possibly from Roman law. See F. Ward, Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1477 (1989). Ward points out that a double jeopardy challenge can be waived by a pretrial agreement because of a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Broce. The author suggests that the military judge should include in their inquiry about whether a waiver is knowing and intentional and whether the defendant understands that waiving the right to trial as part of a plea agreement is also waiving the double jeopardy claim.

Post-trial duties

January 9, 2011 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

NMCCA has decided United States v. Owens.

The appellant asserts that the attorney-client relationship with his detailed trial defense counsel was terminated without good cause, leaving the appellant legally and factually without post-trial representation. The basis for the appellant’s claim is that substitute counsel failed to establish an attorney-client relationship with the appellant prior to receipt of the staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR).

The court makes clear in footnote 3, that:

New CCA opinions

November 12, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Navy.

1. United States v. Curry. This is a BAH case.

The Government proceeded on a theory of a fraudulent marriage as a basis to commit larceny by trick.
The court held oral argument in this case and specified two additional issues to the parties.2 Additional pleadings were later filed. After carefully considering the record of trial and the pleadings of the parties, we decide this case based solely on the assigned error and conclude that the evidence was factually insufficient to sustain the finding of guilt as to the charge of larceny, either on the proffered theory of larceny by trick or under a possible theory of wrongful withholding.

Wuterich sitrep

October 29, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Mercury News is reporting that United States v. Wuterich is delayed until 24 January 2011, pending a resolution of their issue of defense counsel representation. AP reports the same, as does The Canadian Press.

NMCCA unpublished op. on “immunity”

October 3, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

United States v. Sagona, sentenced at court-martial on 8 May 2008, appeal decided 30 September 2010.

The issue was IAC of trial defense counsel who allegedly failed to investigate and advise on a potential defense of immunity. R.C.M. 704 covers the issues of immunity, tempered by case law. Basically only the GCMCA can grant immunity, but . . . . Cooke v. Orser, 12 M.J. 335 (C.M.A, 1982), is one of the more well known cases about immunity outside the R.C.M. and UCMJ requirements.

The court in Sagona had ordered a Dubay hearing. See United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1986) and United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236 (C.M.A. 1986).

Instructions

October 2, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

I posted yesterday on a new Army case dealing with instructions on an affirmative defense in a court-martial under the UCMJ.

Today I’m posting on United States v. Ramon, an unpublished opinion from the NMCCA dated 28 September 2010.

In his sole assignment of error, the appellant alleges that the military judges erred in failing to instruct the members as to mistake of fact as to consent.

New ACCA unpublished opinion

October 1, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

United States v. Stanley.

The appellant raised eight errors through counsel and an additional six in accordance with United States v. Grostefon.

One assignment of error warrants discussion, but no relief. Specifically, appellant alleges that the military judge erred by failing to properly instruct the panel regarding appellant’s right during mutual combat to exercise self-defense when the force used against him escalated. Today we find that any error by the military judge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the findings and sentence.

NMCCA decisions

September 17, 2010 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Couple of new NMCCA decisions on some court-martial appeals.

United States v. Soucie. In this case NMCCA decides that the military judge failed to adequately inquire into a duress defense on providency.

The accused raised six errors and the NMCCA specified an additional error. The government agreed that a charge under Article 123a should be set aside because it failed to state an offense. This left a sole specification of impersonation.