A number of articles are circulating and the blogosphere is discussing the obligations of Major Hasan’s counsel to do anything and everything to avoid the death penalty as a sentence at his court-martial. Here is an interesting item, not that it’s going to be relevant to the Fort Hood case involving Major Hasan, but as an example of how closely IAC is looked at in a death penalty case.
Karen Franklin first notes that:
I commented yesterday that the decision by the Homeland Security Committee could be a potential boon to defense discovery in Major Hasan’s court-martial at Fort Hood.
Homeland Security committee begins collecting discovery for the Major Hasan defense team.
It’s not clear yet, but it looks like the Army and Department of Defense might also be about to do the same. One of the major issues that counsel have to pursue in death penalty cases at court-martial is the persons background. Besides the potential insanity issue on the merits, it is critical to develop as much of a personal history and background as possible. That means the defense will be requesting, and if they are smart, the government providing the expert assistance of a mitigation expert. The committee and potential Army actions will be of potential assistance to the defense. True, the investigations could develop something negative, but in this case that’s not something the defense needs to worry about at this stage. The defense needs information, the prosecution will try to stop or delay them getting it, so outside help is welcome.
And pigs have wings and can fly.
The media continues to make the comment that investigators are waiting to talk with Major Hasan, at Fort Hood, and once they do we’ll know more about his motives. Huh? We’ll find out at court-martial what each party is suggesting are the reasons and motives, but unlikely before then, except for the continual extra-judicial statements by people close to the investigation who have been told not to talk about it but are quite happy to without a name.
Major Hasan asked for counsel, he’s got counsel; he’s a represented accused; charges are preferred; and he’s apparently in custody. So . . .
Major Hasan’s acts at Fort Hood are quite appropriately being viewed as apt to impose a death penalty at his court-martial. Based on what we are seeing and hearing there seems to be little doubt that the prosecution can gain a conviction (although an insanity defense is not out of the question). Regardless, the events at Fort Hood are once again stirring the death penalty debate in general. So here is a piece about death penalty case exonerations.
This empirical study examines for the first time how the criminal system in the United States handled the cases of people who were subsequently found innocent through postconviction DNA testing. The data collected tell the story of this unique group of exonerees, starting with their criminal trials, moving through levels of direct appeals and habeas corpus review, and ending with their eventual exonerations. Beginning with the trials of these exonerees, this study examines the leading types of evidence supporting their
wrongful convictions, which were erroneous eyewitness identifications, forensic evidence, informant testimony, and false confessions. Yet our system of criminal appeals and postconviction review poorly addressed factual deficiencies in these trials. Few exonerees brought claims regarding those facts or claims alleging their innocence. For those who did, hardly any claims were granted by courts. Far from recognizing innocence, courts often denied relief by finding errors to be harmless. Criminal appeals and postconviction proceedings brought before these exonerees proved their innocence using DNA testing yielded apparently high numbers of reversals—a 14% reversal rate. However, that reversal rate was indistinguishable from the background reversal rates of comparable rape and murder convictions. Our system may produce high rates of reversible errors during rape and murder trials. Finally, even after DNA testing was available, many exonerees had difficulty securing
access to testing and ultimately receiving relief. These findings all demonstrate how our criminal system failed to effectively review unreliable factual evidence, and, as a result, misjudged innocence.
From the introduction: Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Columbia L. Rev. 55 (2008).
How far should members of congress or the President, or anyone, get involved in how to prosecute Major Hasan for his acts at Fort Hood. Certainly the victims are entitled to be involved and are required to be through the Department of Defense Victim-Witness Assistance Program. The program does not give politicians or government officials a right to be involved.
Risch Urges Additional Murder Charge in Fort Hood Slayings
This article reports that at least two Congress people are getting involved seeking to influence the prosecution of Major Hasan. Are they creating fodder for various defense motions, making the prosecutions job a political one, or just plain bad form. The talk is about Article 119a, UCMJ, a product of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA), which is an outgrowth of special interests who convinced Congress in 2004 that a fetus is a child. It’s a political issue, it was a political hot-potato then, and potentially still is, albeit there is a statute in place. I guess we should see what other pressures and special interests can get on board to help the prosecutors out, and possibly the defense in the process – I’m sure both sides will be happy for the extra help.
A question arises for Major Hasan and the court-martial about venue or situs or trial at Fort Hood or somewhere else. Here is the general rule from R.C.M. 906(b)(11), for a change of venue of a court-martial:
United States v. Curtis was at one time a death penalty case, but not anymore as a result of post-trial actions. Here though is the court on change of venue:
Appellant argues that the defense counsel should have asked for a change of venue because of pretrial publicity. However, pretrial publicity standing alone, no matter how widespread, is not a sufficient reason for a change of venue. As will be discussed in Issue XV, the defense is not entitled to have such a motion granted unless it is shown that such publicity has permeated the panel members. In most instances a motion for a change of venue takes place after the voir dire. But "where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it [**35] to another county…." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966). However, a showing of actual prejudice is usually necessary before a change of venue is granted. In this case the pretrial publicity had not so permeated the courtroom that the defense was left with promises of members to disregard what they might have heard.
Online Newshour reports:
And it doesn’t have to be all 12 members voting him guilty. Two-thirds to convict is enough. And it does have to be unanimous to give him the death penalty.
In a death penalty case the members have to be unanimous on a finding of guilty. The unanimity requirement different than for any other special and general court-martial.
There is a great deal of pontificating on both sides of the aisle about Major Hasan, Fort Hood, and intelligence failures. Here is a rational discussion and perspective.
In last week’s global security and intelligence report, we discussed the recent call by the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets in the Muslim world and the West. We also noted how it is relatively simple to conduct such attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns or even knives and clubs.
The next day, a lone gunman, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, opened fire on a group of soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas.
An official news release from Fort Hood PAO states that:
The charges filed against Hasan include 13 specifications of premeditated murder, in violation of Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice, (emphasis added).
hat-tip to CAAFLog. The media has been speculating all afternoon based on a CID news conference. I would not imagine CID to be a spokesperson for the Article 32, UCMJ, appointing authority, and if it’s CID, I’d want to see it in writing. One suspects CID is wanting a little face time with the public. CID investigates, they don’t decide what charges will be preferred.
Here’s the question, I think.
Military.com, as with many other media outlets are reporting:
Nidal Malik Hasan’s overly zealous religious views and strange behavior worried the doctors overseeing his medical training, but they saw no evidence that he was violent or a threat.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog