Articles Tagged with court-martial

Briscoe v. Virginia, a post Crawford and Melendez-Diaz case is scheduled to be argued at the U. S. Supreme Court on 11 January 2010.  Professor Friedman will argue for petitioner Briscoe.

Professor Friedman notes that, “I have just served and filed the reply in Briscoe. You can read it by clicking here.”

All of the prior documents about this case can be found at SCOTUSWiki.  This case is of importance to military justice practitioners.  There are several cases pending within military appellate courts that might be affected by Briscoe, as well as some cases pending at court-martial.  Some of my prior comments are here.

Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan’s defense attorney skirmished with Army commanders Wednesday over the timing of a sanity examination for the Fort Hood gunman, saying that his client is still too medically impaired to participate.

So begins a piece in the Dallas News.  What’s the flaw.  There is no judge that attorney Galligan can go to or appeal to.

"This is getting dirty," lawyer John Galligan said of the Army. "These guys have made it clear that they’re going for blood."

United States v. Story.  Here the issue is two-fold: what is the response when the members want to call a witness, and what is permissible on appeal to demonstrate prejudice.  ACCA found error in the military judge denying the members an opportunity to call a witness.  On appeal, ACCA found that documents submitted by appellate government and appellate defense could not be considered.  This seems odd, because the defense is trying to show prejudice from the error and the government is trying to show lack of prejudice.

When the members returned, immediately after calling the court to order and accounting for the parties, the following colloquy ensued:

MJ: Members, the bailiff indicated that you had a question? Colonel Meyer is shaking her head.

The Navy’s rule forcing sailors to “promptly” tell their commanding officers if they have been arrested for an off-base drunken-driving violation is unconstitutional, the Navy and Marine Corps’s highest military judges have ruled.

And so begins a Navy Times article on United States v. Serianne.

I have posted before about the new DoD regulation that requires persons E-6 and above to report all civilian convictions.

Here are a couple of interesting items exploring the mental health issues potentially involved with Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s shooting rampage at Fort Hood – conclusion, he’s sane.

Howard Bloom asks, What if Nidal Malik Hasan is Sane?  Psychology Today blog.

Were they the insane acts of a man driven over the edge by the vicarious stress of war? By the strain of hearing horror stories from the traumatized veterans of battles in Iraq and Iran?

No, this isn’t an advert for the Edinburgh Military Tattoo, or any other.  It’s a reminder that

image  Air Force officials reinforce tattoo, body alteration policy.

Air Force Instruction 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance, states "Excessive tattoos and brands will not be exposed or visible while in uniform." Excessive is defined as any tattoo/brands exceeding one-quarter of the exposed body part and those above the collarbone when wearing an open collar uniform. The AFI also  outlines the current provisions and prohibitions to include standards governing piercings and body alterations.

I have posted in connection with some comments about Major Hasan and his desire to have patients prosecuted at court-martial for war crimes and other offenses while deployed to Iraq.

Major Hasan’s war crimes trial requests, 17 November 2009.

The issue has gained new attention with the recent mass shootings at Fort Hood that killed 13 and wounded 43. In the weeks before the rampage, the accused gunman, Maj. Nidal M. Hassan, an Army psychiatrist, told colleagues and Army lawyers that he wanted to report soldiers who had admitted in counseling sessions that they witnessed or committed war crimes in Iraq or Afghanistan. War crimes can include acts like torture, murder, sexual assault and cruel treatment.

A number of articles are circulating and the blogosphere is discussing the obligations of Major Hasan’s counsel to do anything and everything to avoid the death penalty as a sentence at his court-martial.  Here is an interesting item, not that it’s going to be relevant to the Fort Hood case involving Major Hasan, but as an example of how closely IAC is looked at in a death penalty case.

Kiddie porn: Risky to ignore.

Karen Franklin first notes that:

Whenever I talk about court-room lawyering I always emphasize that the person must first be themself and not try to become someone they aren’t.  Once you decide who you are, your “style,” and how you will present, then you can take the other tools of advocacy and adapt them to your personality and form of presentation.  Sure, you can be taught and learn about distracting mannerisms – the clicking pen, the walking back and forth, or about filler words, but you can’t change the essence of who you are when making a court-room presentation.  My theory is to embrace your own self and then adapt the tools.  So it was with interest I saw this item in the November issue of The Jury Expert.

Katherine James, Everything I Ever Needed To Know About Live Communication I Learned From Konstantin Stanislavski: Common Mistakes and Best Practices, 21(6) The Jury Expert, Nov. 2009.

The military has gone through its phase of employing actor/consultants to teach trial advocacy.  I’m not completely a fan of the method, but I can see there are valuable teaching points.  Here are some.

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