Army Times reports that:
Experts say Fort Bragg likely violated the First Amendment when it sought to prohibit reporters from identifying accusers at a soldier’s arraignment.
The Observer doesn’t publish names of victims of sexual crimes. But Pernell faces charges other than sex crimes.
Thanks to safeguardourconstitution.com we have the Article 32, UCMJ, IO’s written ruling on several matters in LTC Lakin’s case.
Note, “the Army” did not refuse the defense requests. The IO did, acting in his role assigned under Article 32, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 405. This is what I would have expected MAJ Kemkes, the military defense counsel to have told LTC Larkin, and by inference, Mr. Jensen.
FayObserver reports that:
A Fort Bragg soldier accused of rape and break-ins on post, as well as in Cumberland County, is due in court Wednesday for an arraignment hearing.
Aaron M. Pernell, 22, of Tulsa, Okla., is charged by the military with two counts of rape, one count of attempted rape, one count of assault consummated by battery, two counts of burglary and one count of housebreaking, according to a release from the 82nd Airborne Division.
MySA news reports that:
Defense attorneys for Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, a Fort Hood psychiatrist charged with killing 13 people and wounding 32 others in a mass shooting here last fall, won a four-month delay Tuesday in an evidentiary hearing that could lead to his court-martial.
Sitting in the same courtroom where he oversaw proceedings for two infamous Abu Ghraib defendants, Col. James Pohl ruled in favor of the defense, which said it had not received all the documents it needed – including a ballistic trajectory report now being done by the FBI in Quantico, Va.
There are two decisions issued today of some relevance to military justice practitioners. One relates to Miranda and another to SORNA.
As to Berghuis v. Thompkins, Kent Scheidegger of crimeandconsequences blog says:
The Miranda rule remains intact in that the police must warn suspects of their rights and that an invocation of those rights by the suspect requires the police to stop questioning. Today’s decision involves what is needed to establish whether a suspect invoked or waived his rights.
Article 32, is supposed to begin today.
Here is a link to Wikipedia and a biography of Major Hasan. The Washington Post also has a piece on his life.
The Houston Chronicle has an odd item:
Dwight Sullivan and I have often referred to Professor Melinkoff’s book, “The Conscience of a Lawyer.” One synopsis says:
Begins with the 1840 murder trial Regina vs. Courvoisier, when, before the second day of trial, Benjamin Courvoisier, the accused, confesses to his lawyer that he committed the crime. The first half of the text describes, in polished narrative style, the course and circumstances of this highly intriguing trial. In the remainder, the author discusses the intricate ethical, moral and strategic issues raised by the uncomfortable position in which the defense counsel is found.
In a CAAFLog posting Dwight says:
1 June 2010: the Article 32, UCMJ, hearing ICO MAJ Nidal Malik Hasan is set to begin at Fort Hood. MAJ Hasan is in pretrial confinement therefore the Article 10, UCMJ, speedy trial clock applies.
On 26 May 2010, Mr. Galligan, MAJ Hasan’s civilian counsel posted this on his blog.
Today is the deadline, imposed by the Article 32 Investigating Officer, for Army prosecutors to respond to long outstanding Hasan Defense Team discovery requests. As of this posting – after COB at Fort Hood, Texas – no formal response from the prosecutors has been received. And, as readers are aware, the initial Article 32 session is scheduled for just several days hence.
In United States v. Rodriguez, 67 M.J. 156 (C.A.A.F. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 459 (2009) the court changed years of practice when it came to late filings of petitions for review with CAAF. In Rodriguez the court held that:
In light of Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007), we conclude that the congressionally-created statutory period within which an accused may file a petition for grant of review is jurisdictional [and may not be waived or extended regardless of cause].
The effect was to deny an opportunity for an appellatant to petition on meritorious issues or have access to the United States Supreme Court. Prior to Rodriguez it was not uncommon for appellate counsel and appellants to miss the CAAF petition filing deadline, sometimes by just a few days. The reasons for the missed filing generally came down to administrative error within the appellate defense divisions. For various reasons filing deadlines weren’t being tracked accurately. It’s my understanding that the divisions have taken measures to correct the problems. However, there were a series of cases post Rodriguez where the appellant was denied access to CAAF based on Rodriguez. While unfortunate, for those that had no seemingly meritorious issues to petition on there was likely no prejudice. But what about those cases where the appellant had a good issue (regardless of whether or not it was a winner)?
Courtesy of CAAFLog here is a link to a proposed amendment to Article 27, UCMJ.
If passed the bill will have retroactive effect.
SECTION 1. REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES OF A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO RETAINS PRIVATE COUNSEL AND HAS CHARGES BROUGHT UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE DISMISSED OR WITHDRAWN OR IS ACQUITTED.
(a) Reimbursement Required Under Certain Circumstances- Section 827 of title 10, United States Code (article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(d)(1) Nothing in this section (article) prohibits an accused from retaining private counsel to serve as defense counsel before a general court-martial or special court-martial.
`(2)(A) If the accused retains private counsel to represent the accused in a case described in subparagraph (B) and all of the charges against the accused are dismissed or withdrawn or the accused is acquitted on all charges (or some combination of dismissed or withdrawn charges and acquittal), the Secretary concerned shall reimburse the accused for all attorney fees incurred by the accused in the case.
`(B) Subparagraph (A) applies with respect to a case against a person subject to this chapter who is accused of any offense in violation of this chapter under circumstances involving the treatment of an insurgent, enemy combatant, detainee, or a suspected or known terrorist.
`(C) The Secretary concerned shall provide reimbursement required under this paragraph using funds otherwise available to the Secretary to carry out this chapter.’.
(b) Retroactive Application of Amendment- Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of section 827 of title 10, United States Code (article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as added by subsection (a), applies with respect to any charges brought under the Uniform Code of Military Justice after September 11, 2001, that involve the circumstances described in subparagraph (B) of such paragraph.
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog