[I]t is relatively straightforward for an innocent person’s DNA to be inadvertently transferred to surfaces that he or she has never come into contact with. This could place people at crime scenes that they had never visited or link them to weapons they had never handled.”

In discussing United States v. Henning, No. 20150410 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sep. 3, 2015), a good friend had this to say about the case and about DNA examinations which are common in military sexual assault cases.

There are many problems with this opinion.

He notes that:

The KC lab has had problems in the past relevant here, e.g., “chain-of-custody,” sealing and storage issues as noted HERE, staffing issues, noted HERE, etc.

He notes then the general purpose behind evidence such as DNA results.

The logical and legal purpose of using DNA evidence is to do one of two things: either match the DNA to a specific individual, or to exclude someone from the universe of potential matches.  The DNA “results” in this case can do neither, so therefore, how can they be relevant under MRE 401?  To “conclude” that the Accused could “not be excluded” is a nonsensical statement – other than the sample was too small to draw any scientific conclusions – which is after all why DNA testing is done in the first place.

Indeed, as the FBI itself states:

Continue reading

Because of the current politics surrounding sexual assaults in the military, some are wondering what they can do in advance to avoid a later false claim of sexual assault.  This has lead to a suggestion that the interactions should be video recorded, the idea being that the recording will later be evidence to defend against a false report.

Well, that doesn’t take care of the issue about the potential crime involved.  If the recording is done with knowledge and consent, that probably is defensible.  But what if it isn’t.  Many states now have statutes prohibiting unknowing or nonconsensual recordings.  As does the federal government in 18 U.S.C. 2251(a).  Now what.

See United States v. Palomino-Coronado, a decision of the Fourth.

United States v. Dreyer.  A decision from the Ninth.

On issues arising from the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), the en banc court affirmed the district court’s denial of a suppression motion, and remanded to the three-judge panel for consideration of remaining issues, in a case in which the defendant was convicted of one count of distributing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography.

A special agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) conducted an investigation into computers in Washington state sharing child pornography by utilizing a software query that encompassed the entire state but did not isolate or look for military service members. The investigation revealed that the defendant, a civilian, had shared child pornography files, and the NCIS passed that information along to the local police department.

Today, 5 November 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted our petition in United States v. Pinkela, reversed the findings for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and affirmed a lesser included offense of assault and battery.

United States v. Pinkela, ACCA — I.

U.S.C.A.A.F. — I.  This was a summary disposition with a remand to consider the case in light of United States v. Guitierrez.

The Joint Service Committee on Military Justice has proposed new rules for courts-martial, including rules of evidence.  The proposal is open for public comment.


There is much to think about, some good, some possibly bad, and as I note below, some odd.

(d) A new R.C.M. 305(i)(2)(A)(v) is inserted and reads as follows:

Contact Information