A proposal that a military defense lawyer might face in the future. LtCol Greg Curley, Exploitation. 230 Mil. L. Rev. 421 (2023). The author proposes the adoption of an enumerated offense under UCMJ Art. 134, which he suggests would criminalize “Precursor Behaviors to Sexual Assault.” As part of the offense, he also suggests what most of us would consider a service-connection requirement. He suggests,

Exploitation is a separate and distinct offense from a sexual assault, and both the exploitation and the consummated offense that was its object may be charged, tried, and punished. The commission of the intended offense may satisfy the intent element of the exploitation charge.

He does not address whether the offense should be labeled a lesser included offense, the potential for multiplicity questions, or whether the acts of the new offense are res gestae acts that may be separately punished. This will be an area of litigation for military defense counsel.

In May 2023, the Federal Rules Advisory Committees recommended changes were forwarded to Congress for “approval.” Included are two evidence rules changes that will likely become effective in courts-martial during 2025. The Military Rules of Evidence adopt the Federal Rules 18 months after they are effective. The new Federal rule is going to be effective 1 December 2023.

Two important changes will affect Mil. R. Evid. 106 (completeness) and 702 (expert testimony).

Daniel P. Elms, Rule of Evidence 702 Is Changing Faster Than You Think. ABA May 24, 2023, discusses the pending Rule 702 change. According to Elms, part of the rationale for change to 702 is,

Military lawyers know that since the Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, the U. S. military is the only federal jurisdiction that does not require unanimous findings of guilt.

Currently, a military jury (called a Panel of Members) must have eight members in a general court-martial (12 if it’s a death penalty case) and four in a special court-martial. Article 29. Three-fourths of the members must vote for a finding of guilty. Article 52.

That is the current law in the military, but it is being challenged. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has several cases on the issue of unanimous verdicts, which will be decided this term. If the court decides in favor of unanimous verdicts, then the Government will likely appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court (or vice-versa).

Two recent decisions of  CAAF condone unlawful or bad practices when OSI, CID, NCIS, and CGIS search cellphones; United States v. Shields and United States v. Lattin. As a result, the MCIOs are unlikely to change their unlawful or bad practices. More than sloppy police work gets two passes because the military appellate courts think suppression of evidence won’t change that behavior–and the accused is a bad person. Military defense lawyers need to be fully aware of the issues whenever evidence from an accused’s cellphone comes up in evidence.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of our property, including cell phones. In Riley, the Supreme Court properly required a search warrant for (CID, OSI, CGIS, and NCIS) intrusions into seized cellphones. The court has acknowledged that people have a privacy right against Government intrusion without a warrant based on probable cause. As we know, there is an awful lot of personal data that is kept on the cellphone, and that can be retrieved with forensic tools.

In Lattin, the issue was a fishing expedition through the Appellant’s cellphone. The trial transcript shows that the OSI agent believed she had the right to search everything in the cellphone because it had been seized after the execution of a commander’s search and seizure authorization. With that general warrant concept in her mind she scrolled through a lot of information on the Appellant’s phone that wasn’t related to the reason for the search in the beginning. The OSI agent did not believe there were any limits based on her training and experience. Both the AFCCA and CAAF have ruled that the search was unlawful but that it was excused because there would be no future deterrent effect to OSI committing further unlawful searches. The court partly relied on Mil. R. Evid. 311, which wrongly summarizes the law post-Herring that was reinforced in Davis.

In the context of a court-martial, ineffective assistance of counsel refers to a claim by a military defendant that their defense counsel provided them with legal representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficient representation prejudiced the outcome of their case.

Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), military defendants have the right to be represented by counsel at trial. If a defendant believes that their defense counsel provided them with ineffective assistance, they can raise this claim on appeal. The standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a court-martial is the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984.

Under the Strickland test, the defendant must show that their counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Deficient performance means that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

A “coram nobis” appeal is a legal procedure used to challenge a criminal conviction or sentence after all other legal avenues for relief have been exhausted. It is a form of post-conviction relief available in some U.S. states and federal and military courts.

Coram nobis appeals are generally limited to situations where there is newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial or sentencing or where there was a fundamental error in the original trial that has since been revealed. The appeal aims to correct errors that would have changed the outcome of the case if they had been known at the time of the original trial.

The jurisdiction for coram nobis appeals varies depending on the jurisdiction where the original conviction occurred. In some states, the appeals are filed in the same court that originally heard the case, while in other states, they are filed in a higher court. In federal court, coram nobis appeals are filed in the same court that originally heard the case, and the jurisdiction is determined by the location of that court. In courts-martial, a coram nobis petition is usually filed with the court of criminal appeals.

United States v. Filmore.

1. If a victim testifies on sentencing–the rules of evidence apply the same as any other witness. Article 6b does not waive the rules of evidence when a victim testifies in sentencing. (Note, the victim gave both sworn and unsworn statements.) Failure to follow the rules (even without defense objection) gets the defense and government, and court to agree there was an error and to get a new sentencing hearing.[1]

2. It is NEVER EVER a good idea for an accused (or one of his witnesses)[2] to impeach the verdict. Gone are the days when we could legally seek reconsideration of the findings, even through sentencing. The legitimate tactic at the time was to present the accused’s version of events through his unsworn and then argue that the members may wish to reconsider the findings.

Here’s how we start our “discovery” requests–as “Disclosure Requests.”

The defense requests disclosure of the following items in advance of any UCMJ art. 32, preliminary hearing. The request is a continuing one in accordance with UCMJ arts. 32((a)(2)(D) and46; Rules 701, 703, 405(a), (e), (1), (f)(7), (h)(3)(A), Rules for Courts-Martial, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019),; Mil. R. Evid. 304(d)(1), 404(b), 705; United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Briggs, 48 M.J. 143, 144 (C.A.A.F. 1999); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also, Uniform Rules of Practice before Air Force Courts-Martial, dated 1 October 2020; Rules 3.2 & 3.3; AFI 51‑201; AFGM2020-02, Administration of Military Justice, dated 5 October 2020, paragraph 5.12; AFI 51-110, Professional Responsibility Program, dated 11 December 2018, Attachment 2 (Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct); Rules 3.3, 3.4, 3.8 & 4.2 and Attachment 7 (Air Force Standards for Criminal Justice), Chapter 5. These items are relevant under UCMJ art. 32(a)(2)(D) and which calls upon the preliminary hearing officer to make a referral recommendation.

NOTE: In the event charges are referred to trial, this disclosure request immediately becomes the FIRST defense discovery request.

A person being tried at court-martial may have their case dismissed before the members (jury) reach any findings. One way that can happen is when the military judge declares a mistrial. Your military defense lawyer should know what to do if the same charges are re-referred to a court-martial–the prosecution taking a second attempt to convict you.

In a recent case, we had that happen. Unlike uniformed defense counsel, we immediately filed a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to prevent the second trial. In Murillo, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has agreed that (1) the court has jurisdiction to hear a Writ petition on this issue and (2) the military judge erred in declaring a mistrial. Thus, the court has dismissed the charges. (As of 5 Feb., we do have to wait to see if the prosecution will appeal that decision.)

The Double Jeopardy Clause‘s whole concept is to protect the accused from a second or subsequent trial on the same charges. The trial itself is what is prohibited. The case is United States v. Murillo, No. 202200132 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2023) (unpub.). The Double Jeopardy Clause is in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which says, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . ” The bar against double jeopardy comes from English common law, possibly from Roman law. See F. Ward, Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1477 (1989). Ward points out that a double jeopardy challenge can be waived by a pretrial agreement because of a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Broce. The author suggests that the military judge should include in their inquiry about whether a waiver is knowing and intentional and whether the defendant understands that waiving the right to trial as part of a plea agreement is also waiving the double jeopardy claim.

A press release alerts us to several proposals for the NDAA FY 2023 which could affect military justice. One addresses Supreme Court access (something NIMJ has long advocated for), and another is the question of unanimous verdicts post-Ramos v. Louisiana. A third addresses a suspect’s records (and their removal) when “Service member is subject to non-judicial punishment for the offense to which the record pertains; or is pardoned for the offense to which the record pertains.” You can find the House Armed Services Committee actions here. We get many requests from persons who want to have criminal records expunged when their case is not referred to court-martial but is dealt with by Article 15 (NJP) or administrative discharge. These records often wrongly suggest the person was “convicted.” They also can be retrieved by current and future employers when making a hiring decision. So, the “Titling” of a subject on MCIO investigation can be affected for the rest of their life, even when not convicted of something.

Courtesy GMJR.

For those following the ongoing litigation in Dial, here is a link to the current status (18072022).

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