From time to time  I recommend articles, cases, or books to read that may be of interest and help to practitioners.  Here are couple of plays to add to the mix, courtesy of Global Military Justice Reform blog, and I quote.

Anthony Thommasini of The New York Timeshas written this strong and quite positive review of the opera “An American Soldier,” concerning the suicide of U.S. Army Private Danny Chenand the ensuing court-martial. It’s playing in St. Louis.

Can you think of another opera that concerns military justice? Benjamin Britten‘s Billy Budd and the more obscure My Lai come to mind. There is also an Overture to The Andersonville Trial, about the notorious Confederate prison camp.

Once the MCIO gets a “confession” or DNA in a sexual assault case, it seems, they stop investigating–bad.

Whether you have DNA or not–whether you are trial counsel or defense counsel–gathering non-DNA evidence can be vital to your case.

Complaining witness says she and accused were at a bar drinking and the accused later took advantage of her because she was drunk.  OK, where are the bar receipts?  No, the MCIO is unlikely to ask and by the time the defense comes on board the register receipts may not be available.  Note, I have had several cases where the client has been saved by going to the bar with his credit card and getting the receipts.  The receipt tells you a number of things:  time paid (possibly related to time left the bar when paying the tab), (depending on the software) the number and type of drinks (huuum…four people in the party, four drinks, and just how many did the CW really drink?)  Or, how about the video from the base entry point when the CW walks or drives or is driven on base?  Is it possible the video helps show how unintoxicated the CW was or wasn’t?  CCTV?  Remember, the MCIO doesn’t usually care about this stuff.

The director of public prosecutions has pledged to apologise over failures in 47 rape and serious sexual offence cases where vital evidence was withheld from defence lawyers.

From Juliet Bremner with ITV(UK).

On Tuesday, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) revealed that issues with disclosure had been identified in 47 of 3,637 cases in England and Wales that were reviewed between January and mid-February.

“of late, an important shift has occurred in the views of state and lower federal courts, which have increasingly found fault with “new-generation” SORN laws, which in many respects are more expansive and onerous than those condoned by the” Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (cleaned up?).

In the federal judicial realm, the Sixth Court of Appeals in Does v. Snyder unanimously invalidated on federal ex post facto grounds Michigan’s law that, like many other amended state laws, not only requires in-person information verification and updating by registrants, but also limits where they can live and work. To the Sixth Circuit, Michigan’s SORN law was “something altogether different from and more troubling than Alaska’s circa 2000 first-generation registry law.”  Tellingly, when the State petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court invited the Acting U.S. Solicitor General to weigh in and brief the matter, the latter acknowledged the correctness of the decision in light of what it termed the “distinctive features” of Michigan’s law.  Whether it is accurate to say that the Michigan law varies so substantially as to make it sui generis is certainly subject to dispute,19 but the reluctance of the Court and the Solicitor General (in the Trump administration, no less) to let stand a circuit decision categorically invalidating a state SORN law, using quite denunciatory language,20 was a significant surprise.

From, Logan, Wayne A., Challenging the Punitiveness of ‘New-Generation’ SORN Laws (May 18, 2018). 21 New Criminal Law Review (2018 Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180899

(cleaned up)

Yes, back in 1976 I got my Bluebook and throughout the three years of law school, it was a regular reference.  Ah, but it continues to be a daily tool–for motions, briefs, and such.  I fear one day I’ll Bluebook a conversation with a relative or friend in everyday conversation.

One of the common questions is how best to quote, be it an appellate decision or a law journal.  Jack Metzler proposes a solution,  In Cleaning Up Quotations, to be published in 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS.

Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights.  131 HARV. L. REV. 2117 (2018).

The harmless constitutional error doctrine is as baffling as it is ubiquitous. Although appellate courts rely on it to deny relief for claimed constitutional violations every day, virtually every aspect of the doctrine is subject to fundamental disagreement and confusion. Judges and commentators sharply disagree about which (and even whether) constitutional errors can be harmless, how to conduct harmless error analysis when it applies, and, most fundamentally, what harmless constitutional error even is — what source of law generates it and enables the Supreme Court to require its use by state courts. This Article offers a new theory of harmless constitutional error, one that promises to solve many of the doctrine’s longstanding mysteries.

The rule of lenity is something you should have in the toolbox regardless of being a trial or appellate counsel.

Intisar A. Rabb, The Appellate Rule of Lenity: Responding to Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals.  131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179 (2018).

Lenity’s prominence is unsurprising for a few reasons. First, as an ancient principle directing judges to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly, SeeAntonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The rule of lenity is almost as old as the common law itself, so I suppose that is validated by sheer antiquity.”

Those of us who engage with discharge reviews, correction boards, and federal court on behalf of service-members are used to reading about the presumption of regularity–it’s a regular defense by the gubmint to an applicants claim.

“I was improperly discharged.”

A: “We can’t find any record of your discharge.  Because of that we consider you properly discharged, because we presume the command did it right.  No, we can’t and don’t have to explain why there is no record of this.”

You’ll remember Hills, Hukill, and Guardado.

Basically, there are problems when the prosecution tries to invoke MRE 413 or 414 when all of the alleged events are charged.  The result has been many cases being dismissed and sent for retrial or alternative actions.  But, as reflected below, not all cases have a positive result for the appellant.

No. 18-0107/AR. U.S. v. Jameson T. Hazelbower. CCA 20150335. On consideration of the granted issue, 77 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2018), the judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, United States v. Hazelbower, No. 20150335 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2017) (unpublished), and the judgment of this Court in United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F. 2017), we conclude that the military judge’s erroneous use of charged misconduct for propensity purposes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, for “there [i]s no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to [Appellant]’s verdict.” United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). In the instant case, the victims’ accounts were corroborated by a wealth of independent supporting evidence, including (but not limited to) admissions of rape, incriminating text and Skype messages, and the exchange of nude photographs. Given the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was convicted on the strength of the evidence alone. Guardado77 M.J. at 94. Therefore, it is ordered that the judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

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