Did Iraq veteran’s PTSD spark his shoplifitng charge?  By Julia O’Malley | Anchorage Daily News.

Do you have client accused of shoplifting, a senior officer or senior enlisted perhaps, a really good person who no-one would have imagined as stealing from the Exchange?  Can you explain that?

For some years I have successfully argued from this book (e.g. in a Gen. Off. Art.15, or with the AFBCMR).

Will Cupchik, Why Honest People Shoplift or Commit Crimes of Theft (Revised), Tagami Comms., 2002

I have posted about various federal law suits by military officers seeking to avoid deployments because they do not believe President Obama is lawfully the present – here, here, and here.

In one of those posts I asked the question about possible sanctions against the plaintiff and/or the plaintiffs lawyer for bringing frivolous law suits.

The most recent filing was on behalf of Captain Rhodes, a medical doctor who did not want to deploy – posted here, under the title, “They take the Queens shilling.”

September 15, 2009 1:56 PM

TOM ROEDER, THE GAZETTE

Two Fort Carson soldiers are scheduled for courts-martial this month for alleged sex crimes.
The two privates from a bomb-disposal unit will be in court charged with the forcible rape of a female soldier at the post.
Another sex crime trial that had been scheduled for this week has been delayed, the Army said.
Sgt. Stanley Justice was scheduled to be tried Friday on charges that he fondled a woman earlier this year, possessed child pornography and distributed the prescription pain-killer oxycodone. He’s assigned to the post’s Warrior Transition Unit, which houses soldiers who were injured at war until they’re healed or discharged.

Here’s a useful and timely article.
Hafemeister & Stockey on Criminal Responsibility of War Veterans with PTSD

Hafemeister_07Thomas L. Hafemeister (University of Virginia School of Law) and Nicole A. Stockey have posted Last Stand? The Criminal Responsibility of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan W ith Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Indiana Law Journal, Forthcoming) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

As more psychologically-scarred troops return from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, society’s focus on and concern for these troops and their psychological disorders has increased. With this increase and with associated studies confirming the validity of the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) diagnosis and the genuine impact of PTSD on the behavior of war veterans, greater weight may be given to the premise that PTSD is a mental disorder that provides grounds for a “mental status defense,” such as insanity, a lack of mens rea, or self-defense. Although considerable impediments remain, given the current political climate, Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans are in a better position to succeed in these defenses than Vietnam War veterans were a generation ago. This Article explores the prevalence and impact of PTSD, particularly in war veterans, the relevance of this disorder to the criminal justice system, and the likely evolution of related mental status defenses as Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans return from combat.

/tip CrimProfBlog

NMCCA has issued an opinion in United States v. Glass.  This reads like another of the “can they do that,” cases I come across often.  During the investigative stages clients constantly want to know “can they do that.”  NMCCA’s answer is – well, yes they can – there is nothing illegal going on here.

Here appellant raised the issue of implied UCI during the investigative stages of his case for the first time on appeal.  My sense is they were trying to channel Chessani for a win.

Bottom line:

The CGCCA has decided United States v. Molena.

Before this Court, Appellant has assigned the following four errors:
I.
Appellant was denied effective counsel when his attorney erroneously informed him that he would not need to register as a sex offender.
II.
The bad-conduct discharge is an inappropriately severe sentence.
III.
Defense counsel’s failure to submit evidence regarding SA O’s character resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV.
Appellant’s plea was involuntary due to a failure by the Convening Authority to adhere to a material term of the pretrial agreement.
We grant relief on Assignment of Error IV (AOE IV) by setting aside the findings of guilty to Charge IV and its specification, indecent exposure.

By setting aside the charge on IV the court mooted the allegation of IAC.

I posted the ACCA decision in Lynndie England’s Article 66, UCMJ, appeal.
Now this:  Monday, Sep. 14, 2009, Military high court to hear Abu Ghraib appeals, By DAVID DISHNEAU –

HAGERSTOWN, Md. — The U.S. military’s highest court has scheduled oral arguments next month on two appeals stemming from the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

The appeals of former Sgt. Michael Smith, an Army dog handler, and former Spc. Sabrina D. Harman, an Army military police reservist, are the first the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in Washington has agreed to hear since photographs of naked detainees in humiliating positions shocked the world in 2004.

Bobby Gifford has been kind enough to point our attention to this article.

COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER RETIREES UNDER ARTICLES 2(4) AND 2(6):  TIME TO LIGHTEN UP AND TIGHTEN UPBy J. Mackey Ives & LTC(R) Michael J. Davidson, 175 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (March 2003)

"In contrast, retired reservists are only subject to military jurisdiction when receiving hospitalization from the military, regardless of their entitlement to retired pay."

ACCA has issued a memorandum opinion in United States v. England, ARMY 20051170 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 10 September 2009).

[A]ppellant claims, inter alia, that (1) the military judge abused his discretion when he rejected her guilty plea; (2) appellant’s trial defense counsel were ineffective for calling Private (PVT) Charles Graner as a presentencing witness, in the alternative; and (3) information about an Article 15, UCMJ, was erroneously included in the staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR).. . .

We find the first two assignments of error merit discussion but no relief. In addition, we find appellant’s third assignment of error is meritorious and will grant relief in our decretal paragraph. The remaining assignments of error are without merit.

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