You seek out a witness for the defense and they tell you they have to check with leadership to see if that’s OK. This happens occasionally.
Most of the time they come back and say they are good to go, or they are intransigent and you have to ask the TC to have a quiet word.
Remember this,
“I didn’t want to plead guilty.” Followed with “my lawyers forced me.”
That’s a not infrequent complaint with appellant’s who plead guilty.
“In another, the defendent objected to the Navy counsel’s advice to plead “guilty.” He stated that though he admitted guilt, “he could have beaten it with a good lawyer.” Chaplain Reports on Prisoner’s Opinions of Naval Justice. 5 January 1947, at 15.
Salem News has an article about “SEALs pulled from Iraq.” The article is a lengthy one. From the article here is why there is at least one pending (possible) appellate case.
Scandal on Plum Island: A Commander Becomes the Accused
By Marian E. Lindberg
East End Press, 416 pages
Think of Plum Island, and what probably comes to mind are natural habitats, a lighthouse and remoteness, all of which were highlighted in a recent report on the island’s potential.
Most people probably wouldn’t think of military intrigue, courtroom drama and sexual politics.
Prof. Colin Miller brings, The Admissibility of Statements Made to Doctors Consulted For the Purpose of Enabling Him/Her to Testify
A statement that:
Petition to watch.
Does Title VII apply to military personnel.
Prison inmates retain a Fourth Amendment reasonableness right against abusive strip and body cavity searches enough to state a claim here. Qualified immunity is reserved for later. Henry v. Hulett, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 25390 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (Easterbrook dissents that this right has to be found in the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth):
Importantly, the Fourth and Eighth Amendments have different roles to play with respect to bodily searches and protect different categories of constitutional rights. The Eighth Amendment safeguards prisoners against the use of searches that correctional officers subjectively intend as a form of punishment. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319-20. Because reasonableness is an objective test, a defendant’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant to a court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 (“[T]he terms ‘cruel’ and ‘punishments’ clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the term ‘unreasonable’ does not.”). The Fourth Amendment thus protects prisoners from searches that may be related to or serve some institutional objective, but where guards nevertheless perform the searches in an unreasonable manner, in an unreasonable place, or for an unreasonable purpose. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. This last consideration is particularly salient in the case before us: certainly, a court need not give as much deference to a prison administrator’s assessment of the necessity of a training exercise as it does to measures taken in response to the actual presence of weapons, contraband, or other immediate security concerns.
Brought to us by John Wesley Hallm, fourthamendment.com.
Prof. Colin Miller brings us this note.
Similar to its federal counterpart, Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.
What happens after trial.
Here is another case of mine that found itself in federal court–United States v. Mingo. When the Feds tell you to register and follow the rules they mean it.
In January 2005, Mingo enlisted in the United States Army. See Sealed Complaint at 2, United States v. Mingo, No. 16 Cr. 597 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016) (the “Complaint”). The following year, he was convicted by court martial in the Military District of Washington of, inter alia, one count of rape of another member of his platoon in violation of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Order of Nov. 30 at 1. He was sentenced principally to 30 months’ confinement and was discharged from military service in September 2008. See id.
NMCCA has an unpublished opinion in United States v. Allen.
“We have written often to urge convening authorities and their staff judge advocates [SJAs] to pay scrupulous attention to detail throughout the post trial process. This case compels us to reiterate that urging yet again.” [1] Unfortunately, this is not a new problem in the military justice system. Citing 35 cases with erroneous Staff Judge Advocate Recommendations [SJARs] in a 15-month period, our sister court stated in United States v. Lindsey, almost 20 years ago:
This case presents the court with yet another incident in which an SJA has failed to provide complete and accurate information to the convening authority, as required by RCM 1106. The regularity of these post-trial processing errors is alarming and occurs in many jurisdictions. Most SJAR errors are the direct result of sloppiness and a lack of attention to detail. . . . Likewise, diligent trial defense counsel should identify and correct such errors whenever possible. These errors reflect poorly on our military justice system and on those individuals who implement that system. They should not occur!
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog
