Articles Posted in Witness issues

Are military law enforcement investigations complete, thorough, and unbiased? It depends. The MCIO leadership and agents will tell you they are. Our experience over the years both as military defense counsel and military prosecutors is that investigations can be incomplete, with leads not followed, evidence not retrieved, and bias in the reports submitted to prosecutors and the command. For example, the reports tend to focus on the bad things about you and ignore what might be helpful to you or your case. We call these instances of biased investigations as affected by confirmation bias. Many times, this doesn’t make a lot of difference. But, in sexual assault cases, a biased and incomplete investigation can lead to problems for the defense—and also for the prosecution. The recent Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) decision in United States v. Horne is an example of how things can go wrong and, in your case, might create serious problems if something similar happened during your investigation.

According to the appellate decisions, the special victim counsel (SVC) and the trial counsel (TC) tried to discourage investigators from interviewing a witness. It worked for a while during which time it appears the witness had a less clear memory of events. The TC thought the witness might have “exculpatory” information which they are obligated to disclose to the defense and which might be helpful to the accused.

The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) decision has an extensive review of the facts and circumstances of what happened. Ultimately, the Air Force court and CAAF decided while it was wrong, there was no prejudice against the accused. This case represents how a prepared and aggressive military defense lawyer can help protect you and the record. Sadly, this could happen to you. It is not clear if the SVCs and TCs will learn anything from this case to study their practices and comply with the law and ethics rules. We shall see. The CAAF has these words,

Like it or not, consistent or not consistent with long-held notions of justice, a military member accused of a sexual assault is presumed guilty.

Sure command and others will say you are going to get a fair hearing and trial, but that’s not reality.

Over 100 Law Professors, Others Call on DOJ to Stop Junk-Science ‘Victim-Centered’ Methods

Let’s take a look at United States v. Criswell, a case decided by the Army adverse to the appellant, and now pending review at CAAF, on the following issue.

No. 18-0091/AR. U.S. v. Andrew J. Criswell. CCA 20150530. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING A DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ACCUSING WITNESS’S IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT.

As you know, Military Rule of Evidence 1102 provides that,

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence – other than Articles III and V – will amend parallel provisions of the Military Rules of Evidence by operation of law 18 months after the effective date of such amendments, unless action to the contrary is taken by the President.

So, here is some relevant activity regarding possible changes to the federal rules of evidence.

The Virginia legislature has passed SB1563.  There are several provisions which should be adopted in military cases.

D. Whenever the Commonwealth intends to introduce expert opinion testimony at trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall notify in writing the accused of the Commonwealth’s intent to present such testimony not later than 14 days before trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court. The notice shall include the witness’s name and contact information, a summary of the witness’s qualifications, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, a summary of the grounds for each opinion, and copies of written reports, if any, prepared by the witness.

There is a reciprocal requirement for the defense.  The new VA rule is consistent with federal practice under Fed. R. Crim. Pro 16(a)(G), and with then Judge D. Vowell (Army) in her court-martial scheduling orders.

“We thus readily conclude that ex parte communications between a military judge and an SVC are generally proscribed.”

Yes, inexplicably, it was necessary for the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) to decide such an issue, as part of deciding what impact, if any, SVC’s ex parte communications had in a trial–a chilling thought.

In United States v. Turner, (an Air Force case) the SVC decided to have a little confab with the military judge before trial, allegedly about administrative matters–until you read the facts.

Very broad.

Or, that’s how I interpret a 2-1 Order in H.V v. Kitchen and Randolph (RPI), MISC D. No. 001-06 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 8 July 2016).

At trial, the defense sought mental health records of the complaining witness.  After litigation on the issue, the military judge ruled

There is an excellent post at Volokh Conspiracy.

Here’s the problem in a nutshell: So much at trial can turn on the testimony of a police officer. For a criminal defendant, life and liberty may depend on the ability to impeach the officer’s testimony. The federal constitution, as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, requires prosecutors to disclose to defendants any favorable, material evidence known to the prosecution team, including evidence relating to a witness’s credibility. Much impeachment evidence can be found in a police officer’s personnel file. But in many jurisdictions, a thicket of state laws, local policies, and bare-knuckle political pressure prevents access to the material in these personnel files, despite the federal constitutional requirement to disclose. In the name of protecting police privacy, criminal defendants are denied their due process rights to a fair trial.

Here’s what I ask for in my discovery requests.

Yes, is my answer, or at least that is my answer in a brief filed with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals and in several arguments at court-martial.

Under Mil. R. Evid. 801(2), you can offer the out of court statements of an opposing party or certain statements of that parties lawyer as evidence.  Such evidence is not hearsay.

(d) Statements that Are Not Hearsay.

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