Articles Posted in Up Periscope

Here is Bill Henderson on secession “petitions” and security clearances.

DSS personnel have recently received questions from security personnel at cleared contractors about whether contractors should file adverse information reports pursuant to NISPOM paragraph 1-302 regarding cleared persons who sign petitions to allow a state to withdraw or secede from the United States.

It also appears that erroneous statements have been made to the effect that DSS is directing contractors to treat the signing of such petitions as reportable adverse information.

David Frum has this post in todays The Daily Beast.

“The hard decisions are not not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some hare-brained scheme, which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure is almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of precious lives.”  -Matthew B. Ridgeway, Memoirs (1956).

At the same time Salon reports on his book, “The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor.”  The header of the piece is:

The constitutionality of Article 119a, UCMJ, may be headed back to CAAF.  But there is no guarantee CAAF will grant a petition.

AFCCA has decided United States v. Cooper.  In a short opinion relying on United States v. Boie, 70 M.J. 585 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2011), pet. denied 70 M.J. 416 (C.A.A.F. 2011), the court rejects the constitutional challenge.  In Boie the court reviews the status of similar laws around the country.

Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admission of Prior Sex Crimes

Aviva Orenstein

Indiana University Mauer School of Law

Tamara Rice Lave

University of Miami, School of Law
September 7, 2012
Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 209
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:
In a significant break with traditional evidence rules and policies, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-414 allow jurors to use the accused’s prior sexual misconduct as evidence of character and propensity to commit the sex crime charged. As reflected in their legislative history, these propensity rules rest on the assumption that sexual predators represent a small number of highly deviant and recidivistic offenders. This view of who commits sex crimes justified the passage of the sex-crime propensity rules and continues to influence their continuing adoption among the states and the way courts assess such evidence under Rule 403. In depending on this image of sex crime perpetrators, legislators and judges have ignored the contrary psychological and criminological evidence. Most critiques of the sex-propensity Rules concentrate on the unfairness part of the Rule 403 equation, but we approach them in a novel way, focusing instead on the absence of empirical support for their so-called probative value. This article examines the empirical support for the probative value of such evidence, revealing that current policy rests on bogus psychology and false empirical assertions. Rules 413-414 typify the regrettable seat-of-the-pants psychologizing on which evidence rule drafters rely too often; the approach eschews a nuanced approach to questions of recidivism and the different types of sex offenders. We argue that rulemakers should look to the disciplines engaged in the empirical study of perpetrator behavior before asserting notions of deviance and recidivism to justify radical changes to evidence law. Finally, we offer specific guidance to judges about how to conceptualize the probative value of evidence of prior sexual misconduct and how to incorporate this knowledge in applying their discretion in admitting sex-crime propensity evidence.

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