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SECNAVINST 5720.42G, 15 January 2019.

On appeal, Appellant asserts three assignments of error: (1) whether Appellant is entitled to sentence relief due to the conditions of her post-trial confinement; (2) whether Appellant is entitled to relief because the Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation (SJAR) failed to address alleged legal errors; and (3) whether the approved sentence is unduly harsh as compared to sentences in similar cases. We specified two additional issues: (1) whether trial defense counsel incorrectly stated in the clemency submission the effect of a particular term in the PTA and (2) whether Appellant is entitled to new post-trial processing in light of United States v. Addison, 75 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (mem.), either because the addendum to the SJAR did not correct an error in trial defense counsel’s clemency submission regarding the particular term in the PTA or because the SJAR misadvised the convening authority concerning the PTA. We find that there was no meeting of the minds concerning the term in the PTA and thus set aside the findings and the sentence.

United States v. Rush, (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. January 2019).

Advising a client on SOR is difficult.  They want specific answers and often you can’t give them more than general advice.  There are several points I try to make with clients.

Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), specifically includes certain Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) convictions in its definition of “sex offense.”

Department of Defense Instruction 1325.07 contains the specific list of UCMJ convictions that require registration under SORNA¹. Jurisdictions must ensure that all of the UCMJ convictions listed in DOD Instruction 1325.07 are included in their sex offender registration schemes.

On occasion, a military judge will make a clemency recommendation.

In United States v. Coleman, the military judge did just that.

“that the convening authority or any other authority has the authority to dismiss Specification 2 of Charge V, I recommend that such authority dismiss Specification 2 of Charge V.”

Some years ago the AFCCA decided several cases in which it “held” that the CAAF erred in applicable decisions and effectively “overrule” the CAAF. CAAF, of course, told the AFCCA that they cannot overrule the CAAF and should follow CAAF’s decision.  Now it seems the Army Court of Criminal Appeals may be doing something similar; at least that’s the impression given from two recent grants by CAAF.

In United States v. Tovarchavev (link to ACCA) the issue granted is:

WHETHER THE ARMY COURT ERRED, FIRST, IN FINDING THAT THIS COURT OVERRULED SUB SILENCIO THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING IN CHAPMAN v. CALIFORNIA, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), AND THIS COURT’S OWN HOLDINGS IN UNITED STATES v. WOLFORD, 62 M.J. 418, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2006), AND IN UNITED STATES v. HILLS, 75 M.J. 350, 357 (C.A.A.F. 2016), AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN TESTING FOR PREJUDICE IN THIS CASE USING THE STANDARD FOR NONCONSTITUTIONAL ERROR.

Bethesda, Maryland based law firm is seeking a full-time attorney to join our appellate litigation team in representing individual clients claiming benefits from a federal agency.

Responsibilities include federal appellate case management; research of applicable laws, regulations, and legal precedent; the preparation of briefs for submission to federal court; and other related legal projects as they arise. Training will be provided for attorneys new to this particular field.

Candidates must have 0-3 years of legal experience, excellent writing ability, and the ability to work quickly and independently. Candidates must have a JD from an accredited law school and already be a member in good standing of a state bar.

Appellant personally raises three matters pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982),one of which warrants discussion and relief.

My colleagues and I often discuss the value of Grostefon.  My personal theory is to be robust in asserting Grostefon errors on behalf of the client.  This is based on my years of experience.  I have seen the appellate courts take a Grosty issue, make something of it, and grant relief.  I was reminded of the merit in putting in Grostefon issues with the recent Army Court of Criminal Appeals case, United States v. Coleman.  Of course, that doesn’t mean that any relief is meaningful, as the result in Coleman shows.

After a lengthy but successful appeal, I get this message from a client.

As of this morning I am officially off the Sex Offender registration list (which is great cause I need a job). My family and I just wanted to again send you both a big thank you for all the hard work and great advice you put in over the past few years.

In a legal earthquake for the military justice system, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada (CMAC) has split 2-1 to strike down s. 130(1)(a) of the National Defence Act (NDA) because the majority held that the provision — which deems Criminal Code offences committed in Canada by military members to be “service offences” — deprives military accused of their Charter s. 11(f) right to trial by jury.

The Sept. 19 majority decision by CMAC Justices Jocelyne Gagne and Vital Ouellette (Chief Justice Richard Bell dissented) ruled that to deprive a military accused of a trial by jury for offences punishable by more than five years in prison, and that were committed within Canada, is not justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit in a free and democratic society: R. v. Beaudry 2018 CMAC 4.

The Lawyers Daily (Canada).