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You have heard me speak of secondary gain; a term used by psychologists which we lawyers call motive to lie. There are several motives to lie, United States v. Wetuski, AFCCA, presents two–to get out of trouble and to get an expedited transfer.

Given the timing of A1C ME’s removal from military justice and the closeout of her LOR, trial defense counsel attempted to show A1C ME had motive to misrepresent her accusations against Appellant. In trial defense counsel’s view, A1C ME was dissatisfied with her current situation in the Malmstrom AFB legal office and needed an expedited transfer to get a fresh start and the way to do that was to accuse Appellant of sexual assault. Several members of the legal office testified that they heard A1C ME say once, in the months before her accusations against Appellant, that a group of female Airmen who lived in the dormitories at Malmstrom AFB knew what they needed to say and to do to get an expedited transfer. One of those witnesses explicitly stated that what needed to be done was “you have to have an unrestricted sexual assault report and see the [Sexual Assault Response Coordinator].” This witness opined that

this was “not very” hard. Members of the legal office believed there was an increase in outgoing expedited transfers from Malmstrom AFB during the winter of 2016–2017.

No. 19-0467/AR. U.S. v. Charles E. Robinson III. CCA 20170536. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, we note that the sentence affirmed by the lower court appears not to conform to the terms of the pretrial agreement. In accordance with C.A.A.F. Rule 30A, it is appropriate for the Court of Criminal Appeals to consider this issue initially. Accordingly, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following specified issue:

WHETHER THE CCA ERRED IN AFFIRMING A SENTENCE TO CONFINEMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE WHERE THE PTA PROVIDED THAT THE CONVENING AUTHORITY WOULD DISAPPROVE ALL CONFINEMENT IN EXCESS OF 25 YEARS.

The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to findings but set aside as to sentence. The case is returned to the Judge Advocate General for remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further review under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2012). Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2012) shall apply.

Eve Brensike Primus, Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine: Four Forms of Constitutional Ineffectiveness. 72 STANDFORD L. REV. x (2020).

For years, experts have blamed Strickland v. Washington’s lax standard for assessing trial attorney effectiveness for many of the criminal justice system’s problems. But the conventional understanding of Strickland as a problem for ineffectiveness claims gives Strickland too much prominence, because it treats Strickland as the test for all such claims. That is a mistake. Properly understood, the Supreme Court has recognized four different constitutional forms of trial attorney ineffectiveness, and Strickland’s two-pronged test applies to only one of the four. If litigants and courts would notice the complexity and relegate Strickland to its proper place, it would pave the way for meritorious ineffectiveness claims of the other three kinds. This Article disaggregates strands of Sixth Amendment doctrine that others have jumbled together so as to enable courts and litigants to confine Strickland to its proper domain and use more appropriate analyses elsewhere.

The Article also explains why additional disaggregation is necessary within the category of cases where Strickland rightly applies. Implicitly, the Supreme Court has created not one but three tests for assessing deficient performance within that domain, and it has indicated a willingness to soften the outcome-determinative prejudice prong as well. Failure to recognize these different forms of Strickland ineffectiveness has made the test seem much harder for defendants to satisfy than needs to be true. Recognizing these complexities, and applying the right test in the right case, is necessary if individual defendants are to be treated fairly and systemic constitutional problems in the provision of indigent defense services are to be addressed.

Anyone raising a UCI motion must be familiar with the Third Army cases and those that follow.

United States v. Thomas, 22 MJ 388 (C.M.A. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987); see also United States v. Levite, 25 MJ 334 (C.M.A. 1987).

Checkout United States v. Newbold, 45 M.J. 109 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

Military music will now be played before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Grants in Briggs and Collins.

A British article worth reading because it has application here. Akorede Omotayo, The Right to Silence – or the presumption of Guilt

The right to silence is thought by many Judges and academics to be a constitutional right; which preserves Viscount Sankey’s presumption of innocence in Woolmington . For this reason, the legislative changes to a defendant’s right to silence, brought about by sections 34-38 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1984, represented one of the most controversial reforms of English criminal law in the last century.

Prior to the CJPOA, no evidential significance could be attached to an accused’s exercise of the right to silent, save when the accused and the victim were on even terms.  However, the provisions in the CJPOA, particularly ss 34-35 have sought to alter this principle to the extent that the question that this article grapples with, is whether the right to silence, despite the changes, is still useful in protecting an accused’s supposed ‘constitutional right’ of innocence, until proven guilty.

United States v. Scott., ordering a Dubay hearing. I could not find a subsequent opinion on the ACCA website, which could mean the Dubay hearing produced nothing noteworthy and the court proceeded to affirm the findings and sentence.

CAAF has granted the following issue:

No. 19-0365/AR. U.S. v. Jason A. Scott. CCA 20170242. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following issue:

On Wednesday the CAAF granted:

No. 19-0411/AR. U.S. v. Norman L. Clark, Sr. CCA 20170023. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is granted on the following issues:

I. DID THE MILITARY JUDGE ERR IN APPLYING R.C.M. 914?

I have argued in a number of cases that the Service RPR provides greater obligations on TC beyond Brady-plus that requires more timely and broader obligations.

http://www.abajournal.com/web/article/split-over-prosecutors-ethical-disclosure-duties-intensifies#When:13:30:00Z