Evidence Category Archives — Page 6 of 24 — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog Published by International Military Lawyer

Worth-some-study: Future effect of technology

August 21, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Worth-the-read is A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the source for the ABA article I just posted about ancient documents.

There is another proposal in the Draft relevant to technology. The drafters are suggesting changing FRE 902, which as we know will likely change MRE 902 18 months later (absent action from the Prez.).

902 (13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System. A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).

Ancient effect of technology

August 21, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The abundance of electronically stored documents is spurring a committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference to propose abolishing the “ancient documents” rule.

The rule—803(16) of the Federal Rules of Evidence—allows the admission of documents that would usually be banned as hearsay if the documents are at least 20 years old and appear authentic. The National Law Journal (sub. req.) has a story on the proposal to scrap the rule.

A committee report (PDF) said the rule “has always been questionable” but it has been tolerated because it is infrequently used, and usually in cases where there is no other evidence on point.

Worth the Read from Military Law Review

July 27, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

There are some interesting articles for military justice practitioners in the Summer 2015, MLR.

Barracks, Dormitories, and Capitol Hill: Finding Justice in the Divergent Politics of Military and College Sexual Assault
Rudderless: 15 Years and Still Little Direction on the Boundaries of Military Rule of Evidence 513
Open-Ended Pharmaceutical Alibi: The Army’s Quest to Limit the Duration of Controlled Substances for Soldiers

A Better Understanding of Bullying and Hazing in the Military

Motive to fabricate-a short explanation

July 16, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Regardless of the type of case, motive to falsely testify of a primary witness is almost always of some relevance. The recent case of Nappi v. Yelich, from the Tenth highlights that.

The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right, which applies equally to defendants in state prosecutions, “means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). It includes a right of cross-examination, which provides “the principle means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his [or her] testimony are tested.” Id. at 316; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) . . .. To be sure, a trial judge has discretion to limit or preclude inquiry into collateral, repetitive, or “unduly harassing” subjects. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. But this discretion has limits and “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross‐examination.” Id. at 316‐17.

The state court’s conclusion that cross‐examination of the state’s main witness’ motive for testifying was a collateral matter was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1989) (ruling that preventing cross‐examination on a subject the “jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony” violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right); Brinson v. Walker, 547 F.3d 387, 392 (2d Cir. 2008) .

An interesting confrontation issue

July 11, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Are you at a base overseas?

Do you have foreign national witnesses or foreign language documents as evidence in your case?

United States v. Aifang Ye, No. 12-10576 (9th Cir. 2015)

Opening the door-or keeping it closed

June 25, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

As a defense counsel, I’m always looking for ways in which the prosecutor has opened the door to relevant evidence, but which for some reasons has been excluded or can’t be offered. MRE 412 comes to mind, as happened to me at trial in United States v. Savala, 70 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

But, BUT, as a defense counsel, I’m equally conscious of how I can do something to open the door. I might have successfully litigated a motion in limine to exclude evidence. But now I have the key and have to be careful I don’t give it to the prosecution to use.

There are other ways the defense can open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence. United States v. Martin just decided by NMCCA is a case in point. Although the appellate court ultimately found the proescutions questions plainly wrong, the damage was done and they court found no prejudice.

This is important to today as well

April 19, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The Washington Post has a report today:

The Justice Department and FBI have formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave flawed testimony in almost all trials in which they offered evidence against criminal defendants over more than a two-decade period before 2000.

Of 28 examiners with the FBI Laboratory’s microscopic hair comparison unit, 26 overstated forensic matches in ways that favored prosecutors in more than 95 percent of the 268 trials reviewed so far, according to the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the Innocence Project, which are assisting the government with the country’s largest post-conviction review of questioned forensic evidence.

Recovered memory-or-making it up?

March 6, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals recently, in United States v. D.W.B., __ M.J. ___ (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2015), had to decide “a complex and controversial topic: the admissibility of a witness’s testimony regarding memories recovered through a psychotherapeutic approach known as Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR).” Slip op. at 2.

BLUF: the military judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that KB’s testimony was the product of a tainted and highly suggestive psychological process, and therefore inadmissible.

In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars the use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman, where there is no homicide. The question was left open about a non-homicide rape of a child.

Distinguish between volition and memory-lack of memory doesn’t mean lack of volition

February 22, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The version of the facts contained in the majority opinion is far more convincing than are the facts contained in the record of trial.

It is not unusual for an appellate opinion to be selective in reciting the facts of a case relevant to the decision. This can be attributed to several factors, most of the factors are benign and unintended, sometimes a cynic might argue the facts cited are deliberately selective. But here is the relevant part of the dissent for counsel’s takeaway in alcohol related sexual assault cases. The noted confusion must be addressed with the fact-finder through evidence perhaps, and certainly through argument.

It appears to me that the parties at trial misunderstood the relationships between volitional behavior, consent, mistake of fact as to consent, intoxication, and lack of memory. The question is not whether the alleged victim remembers what happened, but whether she participated in the sexual activity of her own volition at a time when she had too much to drink. Chief Judge Everett‘s concurring comments United States v. Baran, 22 M.J. 265, 270 (C.M.A. 1986), are directly applicable to this case:

Cell tower positioning

February 21, 2015 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

It has been some time since I’ve had a case where it was necessary to have “cell tower” evidence to “locate” the client.

Here is an interesting piece in The New Yorker.

On May 28th, Lisa Marie Roberts, of Portland, Oregon, was released from prison after serving nine and a half years for a murder she didn’t commit. A key piece of overturned evidence was cell-phone records that allegedly put her at the scene.