Oh well, back from vacation. Lot’s to catch up on.
Here is an interesting article:
Anthony E. Giardino, COMBAT VETERANS, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2955 (2009).
I’ve already commented on breath tests.
Here is a new case and continuing discussion which potentially excludes evidence of the Intoxilyzer 5000, a device found to be used frequently at military bases. The issue is actually one of discovery.
I have written several previous posts about the problems associated with the Intoxilyzer brand of evidential breath alcohol-testing devices.
A recent Ninth Circuit case highlights the importance of disclosing impeachment evidence and the consequences of failing to do so. The prosecutor requested a criminal history check on a key government witness. The prosecutor indicated he was unaware of the criminal history which was not disclosed to the defense. The defendant was convicted and subsequently the criminal history evidence came to light.
Getting this type of discovery is a frequent problem in military cases. You will notice that Price does not cite to Henthorn. It is unlikely you will find a reference in military cases to Henthorn as a legal standard in the military for background checks on prosecution witnesses. Military discovery is broader than in the civilian community, and you should take the position that Henthorn is more restrictive than contemplated in military practice. An additional argument is that such background checks do not require a discovery request; the duty on the prosecutor is a self-executing one that must be personally done in all cases.
"the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police."
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
United States v. Crabtree, No. 08-4411, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10720(4th Cir. May 19, 2009).
In a published opinion the Fourth Circuit sides with the majority of federal circuit courts of appeal that there is no government “clean hands” exception to the receipt into evidence of unlawfully taped telephone calls.
Daniel Crabtree was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised release. The government established some of the violations by introducing into evidence certain audio tapes that were made by Crabtree’s girlfriend in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510 – 2522 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). We agree with Crabtree that although the government was not involved in the interception of Crabtree’s conversations, Title III nonetheless prohibited the government from introducing evidence of the intercepted conversations. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Here is Prof. Colin Miller’s comment on United States v. Yammine, decided by the NMCCA recently.
Here’s a new law review article to go along with my rants about how prosecution expert and forensic evidence can be biased, it’s difficult to deal with, and the system allows the problem.
Volume 95, Issue 1
Brandon L. Garrett and Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2009) View PDF
This is the first study to explore the forensic science testimony by prosecution experts in the trials of innocent persons, all convicted of serious crimes, who were later exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing. Trial transcripts were sought for all 156 exonerees identified as having trial testimony by forensic analysts, of which 137 were located and reviewed. These trials most commonly included serological analysis and microscopic hair comparison, but some included bite mark, shoe print, soil, fiber, and fingerprint comparisons, and several included DNA testing. This study found that in the bulk of these trials of innocent defendants—82 cases or 60 percent—forensic analysts called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony at trial—that is, testimony with conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by empirical data. This was not the testimony of a mere handful of analysts: this set of trials included invalid testimony by seventy-two forensic analysts called by the prosecution and employed by fifty-two laboratories, practices, or hospitals from twenty-five states. Unfortunately, the adversary system largely failed to police this invalid testimony. Defense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely obtained experts of their own. In the few cases in which invalid forensic science was challenged, judges seldom provided relief.
Been a while since I’ve posted something related to technology and this century. (I should note a red book sighting the other day at NLSO WNY.) Here is an interesting article. Of course those of us with the offending L1 GPS systems are quite aware of running into brick walls or cul-de-sacs due to inaccuracies. But what will the courts do.
Recalculating, Take 5: Is GPS Evidence Too Unreliable To Be Admitted Into Evidence? Professor Colin Miller posts about a number of items about reliability.
In the article, GPS Evidence Too Unreliable For Legal Purposes, Thomas Claburn provocatively opens by noting:
CAAF has issued an opinion in United States v. Campos, __ M.J. ____ (C.A.A.F. 2009). The court was unanimous, although Judge Baker filed a separate concurring opinion.
This is an opinion that essentially discusses the inadmissible evidence thrust down an accused’s throat through a stipulation as part of a pretrial agreement. Basically, if you stipulate, even to inadmissible unreliable evidence you are likely stuck on a waiver theory. Although it does appear in this case that there was no consent to admissibility in the stipulation, just what the testimony would be. So the accused could have objected at trial. But CAAF found a knowing waiver of an objection.
Interestingly the concurring opinion addresses the most troubling issue in the case. The stipulated testimony of an expert, who’d not evaluated the accused, included a sentence recommendation which is verboten under United States v. Ohrt, 28 M.J. 301 (C.M.A. 1989). Judge Baker resolved his qualms on the legal fiction that the sentence and the recommended sentence must have been serendipitous, because judge’s are presumed to know and apply the law correctly.
I frequently find myself objecting to or submitting in-limine motions about law enforcement testimony on how they got involved in the investigation. That testimony usually has a lengthy recitation that includes inadmissible hearsay from people, alleged victims, alleged co-accuseds, other law enforcement personnel. You have multiple hearsay, 401, and 403 objections.
Here’s how the state of Maryland recently dealt with this issue and it’s instructive.
Here is a follow-up on a proposed change to Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), a good recommendation.
On April 23-24, 2009, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, of the U.S. Judicial Conference, recommended a proposed amendment to Evidence Rule 804(b)(3). The proposed amendment would clarify that the corroborating circumstances requirement under the rule applies to statements against penal interest introduced by the government. This requirement already applies to statements admitted by the defendant. Some courts have held that the same requirement applies to statements offered by the government.
FederalEvidence.com
Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog