Articles Posted in Evidence

My good friend Bill Cassara and I have done a lot of BAH/TCS fraud cases at court-martial under the UCMJ over the years.  Typically the case involves a lot of documents from DFAS. The prosecution then calls a witness from DFAS to lay a foundation for the documents and then has the witness testify as to what the documents mean in terms of monies claimed and paid compared to the legal entitlements.  Because these documents are of many pages the witness typically prepares a chart which summarizes the documents and the bottom lines.  There is nothing wrong with that so long as the underlying documents are admissible (usually as business records and documents prepared and submitted by the accused), the chart is an accurate representation of the documents, and the witness who prepared the chart or summary is available for cross-examination.

The case of United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 2008) (Nos. 06-3088, 06-3089, 07-3016), noted by federalevidence.com, reminds us of this point.

Cross-examination might expose errors or inconsistencies in the chart.  At which point the parties can refer to the original documents if necessary.  Assuming the errors or inconsistencies are identified and cross-examined on the testimony is then judged as to its weight not admissibility.

MAJ Hasan’s UCMJ Article 32 hearing and likely court-martial is drawing and will continue to draw lots of attention — of course, duh.  But just as we have seen in other high profile cases there are opportunities for what I call teachable moments.  Here are two from the item posted by CAAFLog about the witness who was ordered to destroy a video of the shooting he made on his cellphone.  Forget the rhetoric about whether or not the Army was engaged in a cover-up.

1.  Contemporaneous video’s and photos can provide vital evidence for both sides.

Nixon said he remembered Hasan because of “his stature and just how he composed himself — stoic.”

“Now what I want is, Facts.. . . Stick to Facts Sir!” (Charles Dickens, Hard Times, p. 1, Oxford World’s Classics, 1998.)

Evidence may be admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 803(8) as an exception to the hearsay rule.  Prof. Colin Miller reminds us that the exception is intended to cover recorded facts, not opinions. 

Here’s a reminder about authenticating emails based on a posting from Prof. Colin Miller at EvidenceProfBlog.  To paraphrase Prof. Miller:

And, like its federal counterpart, [Mil. R. Evid.] 901(b)(4) provides that

By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:

The CAAF Daily Journal for 14 September 2010 notes the filing of a petition for review by John M. Diamond.

Here is a FayObserver.com piece which documents some of the history of this case, including Michelle Theer’s abortive efforts to get a new trial.

According to court documents, witnesses for the prosecution repeatedly testified that Theer did not cooperate with the investigation and a prosecutor told the jury in closing arguments that Theer invoked her right to a lawyer when a co-defendant was arrested.

In two days CAAF has granted two urinalysis cases citing to Melendez-Diaz.  Note Blazier is still undecided.  In the Air Force case the defense did not object, in the Navy case the defense did object.

No. 10-0668/AF. U.S. v. Jerrod D. NUTT. CCA S31600. Review granted on the following issues:

WHETHER, UNDER MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASACHUSETTS, 129 S.CT. 2527 (2009), THE ADMISSION OF THE DRUG TESTING REPORT VIOLATES APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE.

Is how one of my favorite evidence blog prof’s describes a First Circuit case.  I have previously commented on the issue in relation to MJ McDonald’s Army Lawyer article.

Federal Rule of Evidence 605 provides that

The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.

I have been routinely filing a motion in-limine in cases where I expect the prosecution witnesses, typically law enforcement or DFAS, to be providing context testimony.  There are several bases to object:  hearsay is bootstrapped, there is implied human lie detector testimony, there are Mil. R. Evid. 701 fact wrapped and disguised as to expert testimony, and an implied ‘he wouldn’t be here if he wasn’t guilty.’  Here is another case from the 2d Circuit, thanks to Federal Evidence Review.

In vacating and remanding defendant’s drug conspiracy conviction, Second Circuit rejects the "government’s claim [a]s simply not credible" that an investigating officer’s testimony about a co-conspirator provided necessary background on the investigation; the officer’s testimony regarding his directions to the co-conspirator to phone his "supplier" and the actions taken by the co-conspirator in response was "inadmissible prejudicial hearsay testimony," that impermissibly communicated to the jury that the co-defendant had identified the defendant as his supplier, in United States v. Gomez, __ F.3d __ (2d Cir. August 4, 2010) (No. 08-3829-cr)

It is not often that a circuit takes the government to task on it’s evidentiary arguments. A recent case in the Second Circuit provides an example of a circuit’s reaction to what it considers an implausible argument on the applicability of FRE 801(c). In the case, the circuit vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for retrial because the government had introduced at trial hearsay through the testimony of one of the investigating officers in the case.

United States v. Foisy, __ M.J. __, No. NMCCA 201000026 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 20, 2010).  (Thanks to an early posting of the decision by CAAFLog.)

Rodriguez and Gilbride deal with Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2) rule of completeness.  Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2) is a longstanding rule of completeness pertaining to confessions introduced against an accused.  See, United States v. Rodriguez, 56 M.J. 336, 341-42 (C.A.A.F. 2002), the rule applies to oral as well as written statements.  United States v. Gilbride, 56 M.J. 425 (C.A.A.F. 2002).  This is a different rule than Mil. R. Evid. 106.

In deciding the military judge erred in his application of Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2), NMCCA identified six non-exclusive factors to consider on the issue.

Federal Evidence Review has a good reminder that what may appear to be statements admissible as excited utterances may not in fact be so.  Thus, defense as always your job is to ensure that the prosecution doesn’t get away with ritualistic or talismanic incantations of, “it’s an excited utterance (or some other exception)".”

United States v. Erickson, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. July 12, 2010).

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