Sex Offenses Category Archives — Page 2 of 9 — Court-Martial Trial Practice Blog Published by International Military Lawyer

SORNA

June 17, 2019 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Prof. Doug Berman of Sentencing Law & Policy brings this tidbit about SOR in Alaska.

[T]he Alaska Supreme Court in Doe v. Alaska Department of Public Safety, No. 7375 (Alaska June 14, 2019) decided that part of its state’s Sexual Offender Registration Act violates due process. Here is how the majority opinion starts and concludes:

This appeal presentstwo questions concerning theAlaska SexualOffender Registration Act (ASORA). The first is whether ASORA’s registration requirements may be imposed on sex offenders who have moved to the state of Alaska after committing sex offenses elsewhere. The second is whether ASOR Aviolates due process by requiring all sex offenders to register without providing a procedure for them to establish that they do not represent a threat to the public. We conclude that ASORA’s registration requirements can constitutionally be applied to out-of-state offenders. We also conclude that ASORA violates due process, but its defect may be cured by providing a procedure for offenders to establish their non-dangerousness….

Collateral consequences

January 29, 2019 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Thanks to Prof. Berman at Sentencing Law 7 Policy who directs us to Murray, Brian, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved? (January 29, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

I have a standard sex offender registration motion that I use in all cases in which a sex offense is charged and if convicted the client will have to register as a sex offender.

Few appellate courts have been willing to agree that SOR is a punishment and hold that to be a collateral consequence. Some state supreme courts have held new amendments to their state law are “punishment” for ex post facto analysis, but they are few. Despite that, I continue to argue that SOR is more than a collateral consequence. As the second part of my motion, I argue admissibility of SOR as “evidence” under the principles for giving punishment, on which the members are instructed: particularly rehabilitation and deterrence.

Can MRE 404(b) allow for an end-run around Hills and Hukill?

November 2, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

The answer is possibly, but it requires some very specific analysis using the Reynolds test. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals has decided United States v. Hyppolite, II, where this issue arose.

In this case, the prosecution sought to use evidence of different allegations of a sexual offense to show that, “Appellant’s conduct admitted to prove each charged offense could properly be used under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) as evidence that Appellant had a pattern or common plan of engaging in sexual conduct with his friends after they had been drinking and were asleep or trying to fall asleep.”

“The crux of Appellant’s position throughout trial and on appeal is that the sexual conduct alleged in each specification was separate and distinct and must stand on its own. Appellant contends that the allegations were not sufficiently similar to show a common plan and that allowing evidence of one charged offense as evidence of a separate charged offense was tantamount to allowing the factfinder to consider evidence of Appellant’s propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. Appellant, citing United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017), and United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F 2016), renews on appeal his claim that the military judge misapplied Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) and Mil. R. Evid. 403 and improperly allowed charged offenses to be used as propensity evidence to prove other charged offenses?

Private internet speech is unlawful if an officer in the AF

October 15, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

11 October 2018. Orders Granting Petition for Review

No. 18-0339/AF. U.S. v. Scott A. Meakin. CCA 38968. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR ENGAGING IN ANONYMOUS, PRIVATE, AND CONSENSUAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH AN UNKNOWN PARTNER(S) IN THE PRIVACY OF HIS HOME WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT.

A reason to make false statements in a MSA case

July 31, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

As for SPC KP [a witness to the alleged MSA], our doubts about her testimony are many. First, several witnesses shared their low opinion of SPC KP’s character for truthfulness, as well as SPC KP’s low reputation within the unit on this important trait. Second, SPC KP had a motive to fabricate, as the trauma she claimed to have suffered from witnessing this event were key factors in getting an exception to policy in order to obtain a service animal and achieve her longstanding wish to move out of the barracks. Third, her testimony was impeached in several instances by other witnesses. For example, SPC KP claimed that the morning after the incident, she told PFC HM everything she had witnessed in the bedroom. That is, what she related in her trial testimony was what she reported to PFC HM the morning after the party. By contrast, PFC HM was clear in her testimony that both SPC KP and PFC LC reported the next morning only that appellant was on top of PFC HM. Nothing more. In fact, when the incident was reported a few months later, PFC LC was surprised by the additional details related to SHARP personnel by SPC KP. In another example from the trial, SPC KP denied asking SPC MF about his Article 32 testimony, a denial later contradicted at trial by PFC MF. For these and other reasons, we find SPC KP’s testimony was not credible.

United States v. Sanders, ACCA 2018.

The “trauma” was from–

Expanding the definition of CP and other things

July 1, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Comment on Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Expansion of CP Law. 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. (coming soon).

As military defense counsel, we have had to deal with and address the “expansion” of CP into what is often referred to as erotica. Ms. Hessick notes an expansion of CP law to cover possessing images of children who are clothed and not engaged in any sexual activity, and prosecutions for possessing smaller portions of artistic and non-pornographic images.

These prosecutions have expanded the definition of the term CP well beyond its initial meaning. What is more, they signal that CP laws are being used to punish people not necessarily because of the nature of the picture they possess, but rather because of conclusions that those individuals are sexually attracted to children. If law enforcement concludes that a person finds an image of a child to be sexually arousing, then these laws can subject that individual to punishment, even though the image would have been perfectly innocuous had it been possessed by someone else.

Non DNA evidence in sexual assault cases

June 10, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Once the MCIO gets a “confession” or DNA in a sexual assault case, it seems, they stop investigating–bad.

Whether you have DNA or not–whether you are trial counsel or defense counsel–gathering non-DNA evidence can be vital to your case.

Complaining witness says she and accused were at a bar drinking and the accused later took advantage of her because she was drunk. OK, where are the bar receipts? No, the MCIO is unlikely to ask and by the time the defense comes on board the register receipts may not be available. Note, I have had several cases where the client has been saved by going to the bar with his credit card and getting the receipts. The receipt tells you a number of things: time paid (possibly related to time left the bar when paying the tab), (depending on the software) the number and type of drinks (huuum…four people in the party, four drinks, and just how many did the CW really drink?) Or, how about the video from the base entry point when the CW walks or drives or is driven on base? Is it possible the video helps show how unintoxicated the CW was or wasn’t? CCTV? Remember, the MCIO doesn’t usually care about this stuff.

This is why Sex Offender Registration is complicated

May 2, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

I always tell clients that the specific sex offender registration requirements are complicated and depend on state law. Here’s a reason why.

In New York a defendant can be forced to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life based on accusations a jury rejected. So the state’s highest court ruled last week in a case that illustrates how fear and loathing of sex offenders lead to results that would be recognized as unjust and illogical in any other context.

See more at reason.com

Punitive not collateral

May 2, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

I have argued for some time that sex offender registration is punitive not merely collateral to a conviction.

This morning, the US Supreme Court granted cert in Gundy v. US to consider whether Congress’s delegation to the attorney general the power to issue regulations interpreting the federal Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act violates the nondelegation doctrine. That grant on that issue right has Con Law fans buzzing. But sentencing fans more interested in the substance of sex offender registries will want to check out this new commentary by Jesse Kelley in The Hill under the headline “The Sex Offender Registry: Vengeful, unconstitutional and due for full repeal.”

So begins a post by Professor Berman of Sentencing Law & Policy blog.

Hills trailer park

April 21, 2018 | The Law Office of Philip D. Cave

Since United States v. Hills, and then United States v. Hukill, the appellate courts have been trying to sort out quite a few cases on remand. Here is a list of the most recent CAAF actions.

No. 18-0087/AF. U.S. v. Jonathan P. Robertson. CCA 39061. On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, and in light of United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F.2017), it is ordered that said petition is hereby granted on the following issue:

WHETHER THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROPENSITY INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE WAS HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.