Here for the historians among us. Mutiny on the Bounty records.
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At last count, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said he had reviewed 10 separate bills addressing the problem of sexual assault in the military’s ranks. Here is a rundown of some of the legislation lawmakers are pushing on Capitol Hill:
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Here is a piece about a former Texas prosecutor who has been arrested and is being prosecuted for Brady violations.
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The New York Times Sunday Review has an interesting piece about Brady, and the new practices being followed in North Carolina and Ohio to put in place a robust open file policy.
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Judges confronted with allegations of racial or ethnic bias among jurors are allowed to investigate the claims, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled yesterday. The opinion created a new exception to case law historically barring judges from questioning jurors about their process.
Kittle v. United States, quotable quotes.
“implicates the fundamental importance of protecting the right to trial by an impartial jury.”
“Courts consistently have exercised great caution in allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts” for five significant reasons: “(1) discouraging harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set aside; (2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors; (3) reducing incentives for jury tampering; (4) promoting verdict finality; [and] (5) maintaining the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body.”
For guidance in applying the no-impeachment rule, we look to the Supreme Court‟s decision in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), and its progeny. (Followed in the military.)
However, our inquiry does not stop here; we must also consider whether the substantial, countervailing interest of protecting the right to an impartial jury that is untainted by racial or ethnic bias requires that we recognize a constitutional exception to this evidentiary rule. The exception would allow the trial judge to exercise her discretion to conduct a hearing if it appears necessary to ensure that a juror‟s racial or ethnic biases did not impair the defendant‟s constitutional rights. For the following reasons, we conclude that such an exception to the no impeachment rule is warranted.
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Found in 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539
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Here is an interesting opinion from the Sixth about the reasonable expectation of privacy in items transmitted or available through Limewire (or similar P2P programs). There is none, compared to other ways stuff gets onto a computer – in the Sixth.
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer from police accessing it via Limewire when he was hooked up to the Internet. He did not create an expectation of privacy from his efforts to hide files on his computer. Warshak has no application to this situation. United States v. Conner, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7437, 2013 FED App. 0365N (6th Cir. April 11, 2013)[.]
The court references United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
Generally speaking, computer users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data stored on a home computer. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001). Conner argues that under United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc), third-partyaccess to information on one’s computer is consistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. In Warshak, we agreed that the government could not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s e-mails without a warrant because subscribers “enjoy[] a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails,” even though an ISP has the ability to view the contents of e-mail prior to delivery. 631 F.3d at 288.
Here is a link to EFF’s amicus in Warshak.
h.t fourthamendment blog.
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Well, the military has a sort of probation, but it’s not well formalized. Suspending a sentence is a form of unsupervised probation. Maybe some more detailed supervision would be appropriate. No reason a commander can’t do that already – conditions on suspending punishment. Also, the Services – well the Air Force and Army used to have a fairly vibrant return to duty program. Whether these programs will be available is a different question in today’s drawdown environment.
Army JA MAJ Evan R. Seamone is something of a leader in writing about actions for military personnel suffering combat related PTSD and TBI. So this piece is not unexpected.
If the civilian justice system has embraced treatment courts that care for veterans stricken with combat stress and brain injuries instead of punishing them, why can’t the military justice system? It can and it should, asserted Maj. Evan Seamone, the chief of military justice at Fort Benning, Ga., in an article published in the most recent issue of the journal Military Law Review.
So says a report in Army Times. And of course as CoJ, MAJ Seamone is in a position to recommend probation-like actions post-trial (at least for the moment). The report references this Military Law Review piece, MAJ Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: The Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1 .
Also, MAJ Seamone has a chapter in Attorney’s Guide to Defending Veterans in Criminal Court.
[Update] Just as I’m about to go to print, CAAFLog notes the appearance of a tome co-authored by MAJ Seamone.
Major John W. Booker, Major Evan R. Seamone & Leslie C. Rogall, Beyond “T.B.D.” Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the Armed Forces, 214 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2012). [Note, it takes a while to load because of file size.]
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I follow Prof. Colin Miller’s EvidenceProf blog daily. Didn’t realize it until now, but his “work” is available in eBooks for Legal Education.
This is a product from the Center for Computer Assisted Legal Instruction, and some of it appears to be free.
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